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Introduction
Annually, Historical Perspectives publishes papers of excep-
tional scholarship by the history students of Santa Clara Univer-
sity.  Entries were submitted to the Phi Alpha Theta Editorial
Board and were reviewed, selected, and edited for publication.
Unlike previous editions of the journal, this year’s Historical
Perspectives does not focus on a specific theme.  Instead, this
publication includes research on a variety of topics: British
Individualism in the 1790s, the discrimination of Filipino immi-
grants in the 1920s, radical environmentalist movements, the Bok
Peace Prize, Nixon’s Opening to China, and the San Francisco
White Night Riots of 1979.  The articles highlight the quality of
research, writing, and analytical skills developed in the historical
writing process of these undergraduates.  The excellence of their
work serves not only as a testament to the students’ hard work, but
also to the Santa Clara University History Department faculty who
encouraged and supported their endeavors.  
Lambda Upsilon Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta has published
this volume through the generosity of Mrs. Maria Damon whose
gift to the History Department in memory of her late husband
Duane enabled this year’s journal to be published.  The editors
would like to thank all the students who submitted their research
for consideration.  We would also like to thank Judy Gillette for
her valuable work in the production and design of this journal.  
Brian Hurd
Emily Elrod 
Dedication
Professor Dorothea French
The 2004 edition of Historical Perspectives is dedicated to Dorothea R. French,
a friend, colleague, and professor at Santa Clara since 1986, who will be retiring
at the end of this year. Dorothea brought to our department the enthusiasm and
pedagogical skills she had developed in the earlier stages of her career teaching
high school and junior college. She has been able to blend rigorous scholarship
in late Classical and Medieval history with a sensitivity to the specific learning
needs of students. This combination has not only made her a fine classroom
teacher, but also led her to be the founding director of the History Department’s
“Subject Matter Preparation Program for Social Studies,” a state approved
program designed to prepare undergraduates for a secondary school teaching
careers. Although retired, she will not be absent from the department since she has
volunteered to organize our new history intern program. The department looks
forward to many more years of fruitful, if more leisurely, collaboration.
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Eleanor Roosevelt and the Bok Peach Prize 1
      1“$100,000 Prize Offered by Edward W. Bok for a ‘Practicable’ Plan to
Enable Us to Co-operate in Keeping World Peace,” The New York Times,
2 July 1923.  
      2Charles DeBenedetti,  “American Peace Award of 1924,”  The Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography,  98 (1974): 224.
      3Gary Gerstle, “The Protean Character of American Liberalism,” The
American Historical Review 99, no. 4 (1994): 1052.
      4The New York Times, 2 July 1923.
      5DeBenedetti, 224.
Eleanor Roosevelt and The Bok Peace Prize
Elaine M. Anderson
On July 2, 1923, in headlines three columns wide at the top of the
front page, The New York Times announced “$100,000 Prize
Offered By Edward W. Bok For a ‘Practicable’ Plan to Enable Us
to Co-operate in Keeping World Peace”1  The announcement
created an immediate sensation across the country.  Historian
Charles DeBenedetti notes that these few words were the begin-
ning of the “most comprehensive single expression of popular
thinking on questions of war and peace in American history.”2  For
a generation of Americans who, only a few years earlier fought the
war to end all wars, the enduring question of a lasting peace was
paramount.3  Five years after the end of the Great War, the
American government was still arguing the pros and cons of
membership in the League of Nations and the World Court.  To
encourage American citizens to become involved in the national
debate, Edward W. Bok, the former editor of the Ladies’ Home
Journal, tendered, what The Times called,  “the most princely sum
ever offered for a non-commercial idea.”4  In an era when contests
of all kinds were a national obsession, DeBenedetti observes that
Bok’s “beneficence electrified the country.”5  The response of the
American public was immediate.  In short order, according to Bok
2 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      6Salme Harju Steinberg, Reformer in The Marketplace:  Edward W. Bok and
The Ladies’ Home Journal  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1979), 141.
      7DeBenedetti, 224.
      8Lois Scharf, Eleanor Roosevelt:  First Lady of American Liberalism
(Boston:  Twayne Publishers, 1987), 117-118.
      9Scharf, 118.
biographer, Salme Harju Steinberg, the offices of the Bok Peace
Prize received thousands of entries tendered “by a wide variety of
people, from scoffing intellectuals to day laborers.”6  Ultimately,
the Bok Peace Prize created controversy and led to Senate
hearings, but in the beginning, hopes were high.7  
Eleanor Roosevelt’s hopes were high, as well.  Although her
husband, Franklin, was the politician in the family, by 1923, ER
was an emerging figure in New York political circles in her own
right.  She became an active member of the League of Women
Voters, the Women’s Trade Union League and the Democratic
State Committee, holding numerous positions within these political
organizations.  Many of the women with whom she worked were
also active in the peace movement that consumed the United States
after the end of the Great War.  After seeing an entire generation
of young men die on the battlefields of France, these women were
determined it should never happen again.  Lois Scharf, Eleanor
Roosevelt biographer, notes that ER had “embraced the peace
movement of the 1920s,” particularly, “those women’s organiza-
tions like the National Conference on the Cause and Cure of War
and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.”8
Women’s groups such as these were pacifist in their nature and
internationalist in their scope.9  Like many of her contemporaries,
Eleanor Roosevelt was committed to the cause of world peace.
Witnessing first hand the ravages of the Great War, only confirmed
her belief in the need for peaceful solutions for the world’s
7
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      10Eleanor Roosevelt,  “Because the War Idea is Obsolete,” What I Hope to
Leave Behind:  The Essential Essays of Eleanor Roosevelt, ed. Allida M. Black
(New York:  Carlson Publishing, Inc., 1995), 495.
      11Joseph P. Lash, Franklin and Eleanor: The Story of their Relationship,
based on Eleanor Roosevelt’s Private Papers (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co.), 285.
      12Blanche Wiesen Cook, “’Turn toward Peace:’ ER and Foreign Affairs,”
Without Precedent:  The Life and Career of Eleanor Roosevelt, eds. Joan Hoff-
Wilson and Marjorie Lightman (Bloomington, Ind.:  Indiana University Press,
1984), 112.
      13The National Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, Bok, Edward William, ed. Henry
Suzzallo (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, Corp. 1937), 174.
      14Steinberg, 36.
problems.10  It was ER’s conviction that individuals, working
together, were the true source of world peace.11   The Bok Peace
Prize competition would bring together, for the first time, Eleanor
Roosevelt and thousands of Americans from all walks of life in a
dialog on world peace.
Roosevelt scholars agree on the importance of the Bok Peace
Prize and the work ER performed for the Policy Committee.
However, there would be a cost.  The controversies that sur-
rounded the Prize were among the first challenges in her public
life.  For the first time, Eleanor Roosevelt would be exposed to the
“kind of public criticism that would remain a feature of her life,”
notes ER biographer, Blanche Wiesen Cook.12  
The Bok Peace Prize was the brainchild of retired publisher,
and former editor of the Ladies’ Home Journal, Edward W. Bok.13
The son of Dutch immigrants, Bok was a self-made man.  He left
school at age thirteen to help support his family and never attended
school again.14  He became a journalist and, ultimately, an editor
for the Curtis Publishing Company.  After watching amazing
changes taking place in Europe after the war, Bok began to realize
that Americans were struggling to come to grips with a radically
different world and America’s place in that world.  The New York
Times reported that Bok believed a “fundamentally changing
Europe [meant] a changing America and that the peace of the
4 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      15The New York Times, 2 July 1923.
      16Esther Everett Lape, ed., Ways to Peace: Twenty Plans Selected from the
Most Representative of Those Submitted to the American Peace Award (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1924), vii-viii.
      17Maurine H. Beasley, Holly C. Schulman and Henry R. Beasley, ed., The
Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia (Westport, Conn:  Greenwood Press, 2001),
301-302.
      18Cook, Without Precedent, 111.
world [was] our problem.”15  Furthermore, Bok, himself, com-
mented that a note of dissatisfaction with political affairs, both
national and international, had crept into his correspondence.  In
the preface of the book, Ways to Peace, Bok wrote that by 1921,
he came to realize that “although it was three years since the
ending of the war, practically nothing had been done by the United
States Government to avoid another war,” and that his correspon-
dents were concerned there were no plans to, “preserve the peace
of the world.”16  In 1923, looking for a way to give the American
people a public forum for their concerns, Edward Bok established
the Bok Peace Prize contest.
At the invitation of Bok, Esther Everett Lape, agreed to
administer the Peace Prize competition.  Lape, an activist for a
variety of political causes, impressed Bok with a number of articles
she had written for the Ladies’ Home Journal regarding immigra-
tion, women’s rights and world peace.17  With Bok’s permission,
Lape asked Eleanor Roosevelt to serve on the Policy Committee.
Lape and ER had formed a close personal friendship while
working together in the League of Women Voters.18  When her
friend asked her to be a member of the Bok Peace Prize Policy
Committee, Roosevelt readily agreed.  She would be able to work
with trusted colleagues toward a common goal that held real
significance for all humanity.  In addition, to Eleanor Roosevelt,
Lape asked another of their colleagues from the League, Narcissa
Vanderlip to join the prize committee.  According to Joseph Lash,
Vanderlip, a Republican, was invited to join the group to help
9
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      19Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 283.
      20DeBenedetti, 226.
      21Meiron Harries and Susie Harries, The Last Days of Innocence:  America at
War, 1917-1918 (New York:  Random House, 1997), 453.
      22Beasley, Schulman and Beasley, 396.
“establish the nonpartisan character of the competition.”19  Even
though the majority of the twelve-member committee was men, it
was this small coterie of women who ran the day-to-day operation
of the Policy Committee.  Bok was pleased with the selection and
distribution of power among committee members.  DeBenedetti
notes, the make up of the Policy Committee “wholly coincided
with [Bok’s] belief that ‘peace is primarily a woman’s problem:
she takes it as her own more than does a man.’”20  For Eleanor
Roosevelt, this statement rang true.
In 1923, the horrors of the Great War were still painfully fresh
in the hearts and minds of the American public.  Like many
women, Eleanor Roosevelt had done her share for war relief.  She
worked several shifts a week in the Red Cross Canteen among
other endeavors.  Historians, Meirion and Susie Harries describe
St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C. where Eleanor
Roosevelt made regular visits to the ward that housed shell-shock
victims:  “To be allowed to talk to the men, she had to be locked
into the ward,” once inside, she saw “battle-shocked sailors, ‘some
chained to their beds, others unable to stop shouting of the horrors
they had seen.’”21  It was an experience she never forgot.  
ER also visited war-torn Europe with her husband in 1919.  In
France, she was able to see first-hand the total destruction war had
brought to the land and the people.  Eleanor Roosevelt came away
from these experiences with an overwhelming desire to find a way
to prevent another devastating war.  To this end, ER actively
supported the League of Nations and the United States participa-
tion in the World Court in the hope that these entities could help
secure a lasting world peace.22  She joined several women’s peace
organizations and wrote numerous articles on peace-related issues.
6 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      23The New York Times, 23 July 1923.
      24Eleanor Roosevelt, “The American Peace Award,” The Ladies’ Home
Journal, October, 1923, 54.
      25Roosevelt, The Ladies’ Home Journal, 54.
      26DeBenedetti, 230.
Lape’s invitation to join the Bok Peace Prize Policy Committee
was extended to Eleanor Roosevelt at just the right time.
The Policy Committee had several tasks in addition to the day-
to-day management of the competition.  The committee read and
vetted all submissions, selected the Jury of Award and prepared the
terms and conditions of the contest.  The deadline for submission
of peace plans was to be November 15, 1923.  Any American
citizen could submit a plan, which was not to be in excess of five
thousand words along with a summary of five hundred words.23
Eleanor Roosevelt was given the job of promoting the American
Peace Award, as the contest was now known, in The Ladies’ Home
Journal.  In the October 1923 issue of the Journal, ER wrote about
the desire of Americans for world peace.  She acknowledged that
most citizens said the same thing, “’I am not sure to what degree
I want American cooperation with the rest of the world, but I am
very sure that I want something more than we now have.’”24  ER
went on to say that the $100,000 prize was not intended to buy a
peace plan.  “All the award can do is to open a new avenue through
which plans can be offered for public consideration,” she noted.25
The prize money for the winning plan was to be awarded in two
payments.  The first payment of $50,000 would be made when the
winning plan was chosen.  The second payment would be made
when the plan was approved by either the Senate or by popular
referendum of the American people.26  
Even before Roosevelt’s article appeared in the Journal, plans
began to pour into the Peace Prize headquarters in New York City.
The competition was officially announced on July 2, 1923.  By
July 8, The New York Times quoted a statement from the Policy
Committee noting that already, “several hundred plans” had been
11
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submitted “prematurely” to the Award offices.27  During the time
allotted for the submission of plans, from September 1 through
November 15, 1923, the Committee received 22,165 entries, which
DeBenedetti called the “fullest expression ever made of the
country’s popular attitude toward matters of war and peace.”28  The
national dialogue on the issue of peace that Edward Bok hoped to
start among American citizens had begun.
The plans were as varied as the people who wrote them.
Housewives and shopkeepers submitted their ideas for consider-
ation.  Diplomat Christian Herter submitted a plan, as did Gutzon
Borglum, the creator of the presidential carvings at Mt. Rushmore.
Even Franklin Delano Roosevelt drafted a peace plan.  According
to Eleanor Roosevelt biographer Blanche Wiesen Cook, FDR’s
plan was a “variation of the current League, which he called a
Society of Nations (heralding the United Nations).”29  Most plans
were thoughtful, some were outlandish, but all had the same theme
– lasting world peace.
On September 17, 1923, as Lape and Roosevelt poured over
thousands of entries, The New York Times announced the Jury of
Award for the Bok Peace Prize.  Selected for their varied back-
grounds, the seven members of the panel understood the complex
issues of international relations. 30  Elihu Root, a widely respected
elder statesman, agreed to chair the Jury of Award.  Root, a
Republican, had served Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft and
Harding.  In 1912 he had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for
his many contributions toward world peace.  However, in spite of
the care taken to select a non-partisan panel, the general perception
was that the judges favored the League of Nations and the World
Court.  It was this perception of a pre-determined outcome that set
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nationalistic groups on edge and laid the groundwork for the
controversy that would engulf the Bok Peace Prize.31
On January 7, 1924, the winner of the Bok Peace Prize
competition was announced in The New York Times.  Again, the
headlines were three columns wide and proclaimed, “$50,000 Bok
Peace Plan Announced; Provides For Entry Into World Court,
Conditional Help to League of Nations.”32  The full text of the
winning plan was also included in the article.  The author of the
winning plan was Charles Levermore, the retired president of
Adelphi College, Garden City, New York.  However, in accor-
dance with the conditions of the competition, the Policy Commit-
tee and Jury withheld the name of the author of peace plan #1469
until the completion of the nation-wide referendum in February
1924.33  
Plans were immediately set into motion regarding the prom-
ised national referendum on the winning plan.  Months earlier, the
Policy Committee had formed a Co-operating Council composed
of a wide variety of organizations to assist the Policy Committee
in its work.  Ninety-seven national organizations had stepped
forward offering their services in advertising the Bok Peace Prize
to their constituents and assisting in the referendum.34  This was an
amazing offer.  The groups that made up the Council were diverse
in their make-up.  There were business and labor organizations,
religious groups, women’s clubs, community service organizations
and fraternal orders.  According to an article in The New York
Times, these groups had an estimated membership of between forty
and fifty million.35  By December 1923, the Committee announced
in The New York Times, that “over 4,000 daily and weekly newspa-
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pers” had agreed to carry the official ballot along with a “digest”
of the winning plan.36
The referendum had an extraordinary scope.  Every commu-
nity across the country, no matter the size, received a share of the
ballots.  State governors and town mayors joined colleges and
universities in support of the peace plan referendum.  Short of a
full-scale national election, nothing like this national referendum
for peace had been done before.37
The beginning of the referendum coincided with an upswing
in criticism of the winning plan and the Bok Peace Prize competi-
tion itself.  From the start, there were concerns about the impartial-
ity of the jurors.  As individuals, they were above reproach,
however, some critics duly noted their political opinions.  Accord-
ing to DeBenedetti, suffragist and avowed pro-League advocate,
Carrie Chapman Catt, commented favorably on the jury members
because they were, “all, or nearly all, in favor of the League of
Nations.” 38   However, ugly and potentially more dangerous
accusations were now being made in higher political circles.
Because the selected plan encouraged the United States to join the
World Court and cooperate in League matters, the political debate
over United States entry into the League of Nations flared up with
renewed intensity.  Blanche Cook comments that in regard to the
chosen plan, “Senate isolationists were outraged and called for an
investigation into the un-American and potentially treasonous
nature of the Bok Award.”39   As public skepticism of the competi-
tion grew, the motives of Bok, Lape, the Policy Committee and the
Jury of Award became suspect.
On January 17, 1923, just one week after announcing the
winning peace plan, an article in The New York Times noted that
Missouri Senator James Reed had directed the Senate Special
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Committee on Propaganda to investigate the Bok Peace Prize
competition.  The Policy Committee was charged with trying to
influence both foreign and domestic policies of the United States
through the use of propaganda, advertising, money or publicity.40
Bok was called before the Committee on January 21, 1924.   “The
ill-educated immigrant, more than held his own before Moses and
Reed,” who were, according to DeBenedetti, “two of the Senate’s
most relentless interrogators.”41  Bok deflected questions regarding
funds spent on promoting the Prize, managed to get Reed to refuse
to define “propaganda,” and even offered another $100,000 to find
a better plan among those submitted.42  After the Senators had
finished with Bok, the Committee called Esther Lape to testify.
Accompanied by her friend and colleague, Eleanor Roosevelt,
Lape appeared before the Senate Committee on January 23, 1924.
The primary charge against Lape was that the Bok Peace Prize
competition had been rigged.  The Senate Committee tried to prove
the Policy Committee and the Jury had been packed with known
advocates of the League of Nations.  The New York Times reported
that Reed asked Lape if she knew that Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt was
a supporter of the League.  Lape replied that “from her character,
training and education I should say she favored some kind of a
League.”43
It was at this point in the investigation that the unexpected,
perhaps the unthinkable, happened.  Reed demanded to know how
the Policy Committee was chosen.  Lape replied that ER had been
chosen first, then, Vanderlip, with the remaining Committee
members, as well as the Jury selected by the three women.  Senator
Reed was completely taken aback.  According to Joseph Lash,
Reed “was not alone in his outrage at such female presumption.”44
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The Bok Peace Prize had been organized, managed and operated
by women.  The significance of this was not lost on critics of the
Prize.  Blanche Wiesen Cook comments that some of the criticism
ER, Lape and Vanderlip endured was the same criticism that
women always encountered when crossing the line into the
masculine sphere.45
The Senate hearings into the Bok Peace Prize dampened public
enthusiasm for the project.  In an effort to bolster interest in the
referendum, the Policy Committee announced the name of the
winning peace plan author.46  In addition to being the former
president of Adelphi College, Charles H. Levermore was a long-
time pacifist.  Levermore’s background did nothing to inspire
confidence in the competition or the referendum.  Due to close on
March 15, the referendum limped along hampered by public
skepticism and political criticism.  The return of ballots was a
disappointment.  In addition to the nine million ballots distributed
directly to the public, ballots were also published in a wide variety
of periodicals having a combined readership of over thirty million.
Of the 610,558 ballots returned, 87 percent were cast in favor of
the Levermore plan.47
In spite of the controversy and disappointing referendum
result, Edward Bok and Eleanor Roosevelt had each been a part of
something of great importance.  Each one gained something of
value by their participation in the Bok Peace Prize.  Edward Bok
wanted to open a dialogue among his fellow Americans regarding
world peace.  In 1923, the United States was still trying to come to
grips with its newfound position in world affairs.  Even though the
Great War had thrust the United States onto the world stage, most
Americans did not perceive America as a world power.  The
outpouring of peace plans renewed and stimulated the national
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debate on the issues of peace and the United States’ place in
international relations.  According to DeBenedetti, in spite of
everything, Bok’s “faith in the pacific world-mindedness of the
American people,” was unshaken.48  Bok accomplished what he set
out to do.  Never before had Americans, from all walks of life,
taken the time to consider what a real and lasting peace meant or
to consider the world beyond our borders.  
The dialogue that began in July 1923 was still going strong in
February 1924.  Letters to the Editor, commentaries and op-ed
pieces filled newspapers and popular journals for months.
Everyone had an opinion on the benefit of the Bok Peace Prize.
Some people, like Anna Liebert, who wrote a letter to the editor of
The New York Times, suggested that America did not need a new
peace plan because the League of Nations was already in place and
perhaps we should give the League a try.49   Others saw the Bok
Peace Prize as nothing more than a ploy to drag the United States
into the League of Nations.  Anti-League Progressive, Oswald
Garrison Villard called the Peace Prize the “Great Bok Humbug.”
Villard went on to say that the competition was, “a deliberate
attempt” to get Americans to vote, “in favor of the League without
knowing it.”50  For Bok, a person’s political stance was less
important than the discussion that was taking place among his
fellow citizens.  As Edward Bok wrote in regard to the Peace Prize,
“the American people have had time to think, and they have
thought, and the national voice is being heard.”51   
The Bok Peace Prize also helped Eleanor Roosevelt to find her
place in the peace process.  During the 1920s, Roosevelt embraced
the quest for world peace.  During this period, she continually
worked toward America’s entry into the League of Nations and
17
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 9 2004
Published by Scholar Commons, 2004
Eleanor Roosevelt and the Bok Peach Prize 11
      45Cook, Without Precedent, 112.
      46DeBenedetti, 244.
      47Maurine H. Beasley, Eleanor Roosevelt and the Media:  A Public Quest for
Self-Fulfillment (Urbana, Ill.:  University of Illinois Press, 1987), 13.
The Bok Peace Prize had been organized, managed and operated
by women.  The significance of this was not lost on critics of the
Prize.  Blanche Wiesen Cook comments that some of the criticism
ER, Lape and Vanderlip endured was the same criticism that
women always encountered when crossing the line into the
masculine sphere.45
The Senate hearings into the Bok Peace Prize dampened public
enthusiasm for the project.  In an effort to bolster interest in the
referendum, the Policy Committee announced the name of the
winning peace plan author.46  In addition to being the former
president of Adelphi College, Charles H. Levermore was a long-
time pacifist.  Levermore’s background did nothing to inspire
confidence in the competition or the referendum.  Due to close on
March 15, the referendum limped along hampered by public
skepticism and political criticism.  The return of ballots was a
disappointment.  In addition to the nine million ballots distributed
directly to the public, ballots were also published in a wide variety
of periodicals having a combined readership of over thirty million.
Of the 610,558 ballots returned, 87 percent were cast in favor of
the Levermore plan.47
In spite of the controversy and disappointing referendum
result, Edward Bok and Eleanor Roosevelt had each been a part of
something of great importance.  Each one gained something of
value by their participation in the Bok Peace Prize.  Edward Bok
wanted to open a dialogue among his fellow Americans regarding
world peace.  In 1923, the United States was still trying to come to
grips with its newfound position in world affairs.  Even though the
Great War had thrust the United States onto the world stage, most
Americans did not perceive America as a world power.  The
outpouring of peace plans renewed and stimulated the national
12 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      48DeBenedetti, 247.
      49The New York Times, 5 July 1923.
      50DeBenedetti, 241.
      51Lape, xv.
debate on the issues of peace and the United States’ place in
international relations.  According to DeBenedetti, in spite of
everything, Bok’s “faith in the pacific world-mindedness of the
American people,” was unshaken.48  Bok accomplished what he set
out to do.  Never before had Americans, from all walks of life,
taken the time to consider what a real and lasting peace meant or
to consider the world beyond our borders.  
The dialogue that began in July 1923 was still going strong in
February 1924.  Letters to the Editor, commentaries and op-ed
pieces filled newspapers and popular journals for months.
Everyone had an opinion on the benefit of the Bok Peace Prize.
Some people, like Anna Liebert, who wrote a letter to the editor of
The New York Times, suggested that America did not need a new
peace plan because the League of Nations was already in place and
perhaps we should give the League a try.49   Others saw the Bok
Peace Prize as nothing more than a ploy to drag the United States
into the League of Nations.  Anti-League Progressive, Oswald
Garrison Villard called the Peace Prize the “Great Bok Humbug.”
Villard went on to say that the competition was, “a deliberate
attempt” to get Americans to vote, “in favor of the League without
knowing it.”50  For Bok, a person’s political stance was less
important than the discussion that was taking place among his
fellow citizens.  As Edward Bok wrote in regard to the Peace Prize,
“the American people have had time to think, and they have
thought, and the national voice is being heard.”51   
The Bok Peace Prize also helped Eleanor Roosevelt to find her
place in the peace process.  During the 1920s, Roosevelt embraced
the quest for world peace.  During this period, she continually
worked toward America’s entry into the League of Nations and
18
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 9 [2004], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol9/iss1/1
Eleanor Roosevelt and the Bok Peach Prize 13
      52Allida M. Black, Casting Her Own Shadow:  Eleanor Roosevelt and the
Shaping of Postwar Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996),
137.
      53Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, 284.
      54Black, 139.
      55Cook, Eleanor Roosevelt, Volume 1, 345.
      56Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1949), 23-24.
      57Cook, Eleanor Roosevelt, Volume 1, 364.
World Court. 52  For ER the experience with the Bok Peace Prize
competition was an education in the issues and politics of interna-
tional affairs.53  Even after the Bok competition officially ended
and her work for the Committee was over, ER continued to work
for peace.  Historian Allida Black observes that, “ER’s ability to
see the complex relationships between war and peace,” would
often put her, “in an uncomfortable position politically and
personally.”54  Roosevelt’s work for the Bok Peace Prize was her
“first specifically ‘un-American’ activity,” and, “resulted in the
first document entered into her voluminous FBI file,” according to
Blanche Wiesen Cook.55
Eleanor Roosevelt, whatever the criticism, would never back
away from her work for international peace.  Her work for the Bok
Peace Prize was one of her earliest national endeavors, yet ER is
remarkably silent about her work for the Policy Committee.  In her
1949 autobiography, This I Remember, she mentions the Bok
Peace Prize almost in passing.  She briefly notes that, “at Mr.
Bok’s request, I helped her [Esther Lape] to organize the commit-
tee and this work.”56  Her modesty is deceiving; during the 1920s,
ER was active in a number of women’s peace organizations.  She
wrote numerous articles and columns regarding peace throughout
her long public career.  As the decade of the Twenties wore on,
Eleanor Roosevelt became increasingly focused on international
peace movements.  According to Cook, ER would become one of
the “most prominent antiwar women in the United States.” 57
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According to Joseph Lash, Eleanor Roosevelt, “had her own
vision of a better world and was attracted to the people who shared
that vision.”58  Her work for the Bok Peace Prize was a part of that
vision for a better world.   She would work tirelessly for the cause
of international peace for the rest of her life, always keeping in
mind the role of the individual’s responsibility in the peace
process.  In 1938, as the world moved toward a second world war,
she wrote, “if peace is going to come about in the world, the way
to start is by getting a better understanding between individuals.”
She would go on to say, “from this germ a better understanding
between groups of people will grow.”59  ER would spend the rest
of her life working toward peaceful solutions to the world’s
troubles.  She would be the named a delegate to the first United
Nations General Assembly in 1946 and go on to be the “moving
spirit” behind the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948.60  These are among the crowning achievements in
Eleanor Roosevelt’s lifelong commitment to world peace.
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Rights in 1948.60  These are among the crowning achievements in
Eleanor Roosevelt’s lifelong commitment to world peace.
20
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 9 [2004], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol9/iss1/1
Images from the Past 15
      1The Washington Star, quoted in Christopher A. Vaughn, “The
‘Discovery’ of the Philippines by the U.S. Press, 1898–1902,”  The Historian
57 (1995): 310; Edwin B. Almirol, “Exclusion and Acceptance of Filipinos in
America,” Asian Profile 13 (October 1985): 401; Emory S. Bogardus,
“American Attitudes Towards Filipinos,”  Sociology and Social Research 14
(September-October 1929): 64.
Images from the Past:
Stereotyping Filipino Immigrants in California
Melissa G. Flores
“Stupid.”  “Morally Inferior.”  “Savages”; these were words that
Americans used to describe Filipino immigrants who came to the
United States in the 1920s and 30s.1  In California, where most of
these men settled, the public was outraged to see them gallivanting
with young white women in taxi-dance halls that regularly
employed women who were paid by patrons to dance with them.
Critics also condemned the immigrants for their organization of
strikes in the fields of Watsonville and Salinas during the 1930s.
These actions reinforced the idea that these aliens were rebellious
and innately difficult.  What prompted this harsh judgment?
Evidence suggests that although this disapproval was provoked by
contemporary events, the roots of this discrimination can be traced
to the not-too-distant past.
Scholars have extensively researched several aspects of
Philippine-American relations at the beginning of the century,
from the media’s portrayal of Filipinos during the “Philippine
Insurrection” (a euphemism for the Philippine-American War
during the time of the war that insinuated that the Filipinos were
the transgressors and that it was their actions that prompted
American response) to the treatment of Filipino men in the 1920s
16 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      2Richard E. Welch, Jr., “’The Philippine Insurrection’ and the American
Press,” The Historian 36 (1973): 34.
      3Antonio J.A. Pido, The Pilipinos in America: Macro/Micro Dimensions of
Immigration and Integration  (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1986),
48.
and 30s.2  However, research on the link between the earlier and
later stereotyping has yet to be done.  Close inspection of the
images of Filipinos presented by the press and government during
their struggle for independence and examination of stereotypes
during their first large wave of immigration to California during
the 1920s and 30s suggests that there is an important correlation.
In fact, the categorizing of the late 1890s and early 1900s laid the
foundation for the distortions that came later.  Indeed, the later
stereotypes closely mirrored the early descriptions of Filipinos in
government records, newspapers, and periodicals.  Tracing back
the origins of this discrimination is essential to understanding why
these men were subjected to poor conditions and maltreatment.
The negative perceptions and discriminatory treatment of Filipino
immigrant men in California during the 1920s and 30s were greatly
influenced by the negative images and information supplied by the
government and media to the American public during the
Philippine-American War from 1898–1902.
This association between the Philippines and the United States
began after the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898.
Suffering defeat at the hands of the Americans, the Spanish
surrendered the Philippines to the United States for twenty-five
million dollars.3  Although only Manila and its surrounding area
were controlled, the American government chose to exert control
over all of the islands.  However, the native Filipinos resisted this
decision and staged a revolt that started in 1898 and lasted until
their pacification by American forces in 1902.
During that period, in America, the government and public
were involved in a heated debate over whether the United States
should annex the Philippines as a colony.  Reports from govern-
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ment officials and journalists who had been to the islands con-
veyed images of savages in need of being Christianized, educated,
sanitized, and above all, civilized.  To those interested in the
economic opportunities of the islands, the Philippine Islands were
viewed as a rest stop and fueling station for United States warships
in the Pacific and as a stepping-stone to profitable markets in East
Asia.  Thus, the United States decided that the Philippines would
become a worthwhile territory of the United States and prepared it
for its eventual independence.4  As wards of the government,
Filipino immigrants would enjoy privileges other immigrant
groups did not have, yet would also face several challenges
because of their status.
Regarded as nationals rather than aliens, Filipino émigrés were
protected by the United States government from deportation if they
ever caused problems, a luxury other immigrant groups did not
have.5  Yet this would not be necessary for the next two decades
because from 1902 to 1920 Filipino immigrants were not a cause
for concern.  During this period, the United States government
sponsored a program that brought young men and women to the
country in order to study at American institutions, several of which
were in California.6  These pensionados were generally unnoticed
due to their resemblance to the numerous Latinos who inhabited
the state and the fact that they came in small, manageable groups.
However, the 1920s and 30s saw a large increase in Filipino
immigration.  Many men came to the United States through
recruitment by the government.  Anti-Japanese immigration laws
had left a void in the farm labor market and the United States
government looked to the Filipinos, “our little brown brothers,” as
many officials called them, for help.  Supported by their families
18 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      7H. Brett Melendy, “Filipinos in the United States,” Pacific Historical
Review 43 (1974): 540-541.
      8Vaughn, “The ‘Discovery’ of the Philippines,” 314.
      9The Chicago Record , 28 November 1899, in “Colored: Black n’ White,”
private cartoon collection of Abe Ignacio, Jr. , San Leandro, California
(hereafter cited as Ignacio Collection).
      10Harper’s Weekly, 27 August 1898, Ignacio Collection.
in the Philippines, thousands of men jumped at the chance to come
to America.  Their goal was to find a good job using the skills they
had attained through years of Americanization at home.  Not too
long after their arrival, though, they were confronted with the same
prejudice that previous Asian immigrants, the Japanese and
Chinese, had faced.  In some cases, it was worse.  Legislation, such
as denying the right to marry outside one’s “race,” and acts of
vigilantism were directed specifically at Filipinos.7  These men had
come to America in hopes of finding success, but instead they
found inequality and hatred.
Discrimination in the 1920s and 30s was fueled by the constant
negative portrayal of Filipinos in the past.  At the time of the
Philippine-American war, government documents, news articles,
and political cartoons transmitted a variety of pejorative images of
the people in the Philippines in order to garner support for the
United States’s occupation of the islands.   Natives were depicted
in cartoons in newspapers and magazines as sullen, dark-skinned
babies or toddlers.  This portrayed them as helpless, mischievous
children while the United States played the much-needed part of
the adult shouldering the burden of caring for and disciplining
them.8  In a Chicago Record cartoon from 1899, President William
McKinley was shown spanking a Filipino child with a paddle
labeled “benevolent assimilator.”9  As the headmaster in an 1898
Harper’s Weekly cartoon, Uncle Sam looked over a classroom full
of dark skinned children.  Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the insur-
gent Philippine forces during the war, sat in the corner wearing a
dunce cap.10
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in the Philippines, thousands of men jumped at the chance to come
to America.  Their goal was to find a good job using the skills they
had attained through years of Americanization at home.  Not too
long after their arrival, though, they were confronted with the same
prejudice that previous Asian immigrants, the Japanese and
Chinese, had faced.  In some cases, it was worse.  Legislation, such
as denying the right to marry outside one’s “race,” and acts of
vigilantism were directed specifically at Filipinos.7  These men had
come to America in hopes of finding success, but instead they
found inequality and hatred.
Discrimination in the 1920s and 30s was fueled by the constant
negative portrayal of Filipinos in the past.  At the time of the
Philippine-American war, government documents, news articles,
and political cartoons transmitted a variety of pejorative images of
the people in the Philippines in order to garner support for the
United States’s occupation of the islands.   Natives were depicted
in cartoons in newspapers and magazines as sullen, dark-skinned
babies or toddlers.  This portrayed them as helpless, mischievous
children while the United States played the much-needed part of
the adult shouldering the burden of caring for and disciplining
them.8  In a Chicago Record cartoon from 1899, President William
McKinley was shown spanking a Filipino child with a paddle
labeled “benevolent assimilator.”9  As the headmaster in an 1898
Harper’s Weekly cartoon, Uncle Sam looked over a classroom full
of dark skinned children.  Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the insur-
gent Philippine forces during the war, sat in the corner wearing a
dunce cap.10
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This adult-child portrayal revealed the hesitation of Americans
to accept the call of what writer Rudyard Kipling termed  “the
white man’s burden.”  One cartoon that adorned the cover of an
issue of the conservative magazine Judge in 1898 depicts this
attitude perfectly.  Figure 1 shows the caricature in which Uncle
Sam flashed a bewildered look as he held a crying, incredibly
fussy, dark-skinned child in tribal clothing with a tag attached to
his leg.  On the tag it was written, “Philippines with compliments
of Dewey.”  In the caption, Uncle Sam said, “Now that I’ve got it,
what am I going to do with it?”11  To many Americans, the
Philippines were seen simply as a burden. [see Figure 1]
During a period in which darker skin was a sign of unrefined
laborers, the Filipinos were lumped into this group as portrayed by
caricatures that exaggerated the darkness of their skin.  They
resembled blacks, Cubans, and Hawaiians, who were all subjects
of discrimination and believed to be in need of civilizing by the
government.  In one cartoon, Aguinaldo was depicted as the
mischievous Topsy from Uncle Tom’s Cabin.  “I’s so awful
wicked there cain’t nobody do nothin’ with me,” he declared.  “I
keeps Miss Feeley [Uncle Sam] a-swearin at me half de time,
‘cause I’s mighty wicked, I is.”12  This cartoon alleged two
characteristics of both blacks and Filipinos: impishness and
ignorance.
The poor sanitation conditions of the Philippines also greatly
concerned the American public.  Americans envisioned the
Philippines as a wretched, bug-infested wasteland, and inhabited
by animal-like Filipinos who relished this way of living.  Figure 2
depicts President McKinley standing in a river with a scrubbing
brush while holding a Filipino child.  “Oh, you dirty boy,” he
 reprimanded.13 [see Figure 2]
20 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      14Pido, The Pilipinos in America,  49.
Most of all, these cartoons and articles depicted the Filipinos
as being in need of civilizing.  This meant receiving an American
education, taking part in American pastimes, becoming
Christianized, and abandoning their savage tendencies.  The
ultimate goal of the United States was to bring civilization to the
Philippines by forcing American ideals upon the people.  The
government emphasized the importance of education in the islands
and educated Filipino children in the teachings of the American
way.  Children were taught to value individualism and admire
heroes such as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.14
According to the caption in one cartoon, the “American school-
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Figure 1
A confused Uncle Sam cradles a temperamental Filipino child.
Reprinted from Grant Ha milton, “Information Wanted.” Barewalls.com,  11 June 1898.
<http://artwork.ba rewalls.com/prod uct/artwork.exe  ?ArtworkID=54168& thumbs=1> (3 December
200 2).
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      17Congress, Letter from the Secretary of War, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1902, S.
Doc. 218, Serial 4043.
house in the Philippines [would] destroy superstition, ignorance,
vice, etc. and eventually end the war and bring civilization.”15
Americans believed that participation in American activities would
help refine them.  One cartoon depicted a Filipino who had
undergone the civilization process.  It stated that his “old habit of
running amuck [sic] will aid greatly on the football field.”16
And although not all depictions of Filipinos were meant to be
discriminatory, their descriptions still imprinted an image of
savagery.  Congressional articles often commented on the physical
appearance of Filipinos, emphasizing the strong structure of their
bodies.  One such document includes a letter written by the
Division of Insular Affairs of the War Department to be distributed
to the House of Representatives, Senate, and rest of the Depart-
ment that expressed Filipinos as “attractive in neither form nor
feature, having strong jaws, thick lips, and flat noses… [but] they
are fierce, dark, and strong, of rather fine appearance.”17  The
detailed descriptions suggested that officials treated the people like
commodities.  These images of Filipinos hearkened back to the
views of Native Americans, who were also admired for their
bodies and then forced to work their native land by the Spanish in
the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Even more
barbaric than their physical appearance was the attitude of the
Filipinos.  According to one American legislator, Filipinos were
angry beasts who were ungrateful to the “heroically philanthropic”
efforts to civilize them.  This was a widespread sentiment since
several cartoons depicted them with looks of anger on their faces
while the government continued to bestow the gift of civilization
upon them.  The Filipinos were “discontented people, at heart
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disloyal and hostile,” as one Congressman stated.18  Americans
recalled these images once Filipinos began arriving to the country.
The first group of Filipinos that arrived to America after the
United States took possession of the islands were the pensionados,
who began came to the country as early as 1903 Those in Califor-
nia faced little discrimination because they blended into the  Latino
population already living in the state.  Furthermore, because they
kept to themselves, spent most of their time studying, and were
few in number, they were little noticed.  In 1912, there were only
209 Filipino men and women in the entire country receiving
degrees or vocational training.19
However, the arrival of thousands of Filipino men in the
United States as agricultural workers alarmed many Americans.
From 1920 to 1929, over 31,000 Philippine immigrants arrived in
California through the two cities of San Francisco and Los
Angeles.20  Disconcerted by the legion of immigrants coming from
the Philippines, many Americans reacted by mistreating them.
These comments and complaints made against the men echoed
some of the same objections first presented to Americans during
the time of the Philippine-American War.  This unfavorable first
impression of Filipinos combined with the stewing racial hatred
towards these new “Orientals” prompted a new wave of racism
towards this group.  Views of Filipinos were largely negative and
expressed the fear and intimidation Americans felt towards this
group.  For example, a geography professor from Stanford
University during the 1920s observed, “they arrive green and
simply as babes in the woods . . . .  They evolve . . . into big-time
gamblers, knife-fighters, and first-rate, brown-skinned Apaches.
They show great aptitude in becoming acquainted with institutions
24 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      21Almirol, “Exclusion and Acceptance of Filipinos,” 399.
of a disorderly character.”21  This view merged images created by
the earlier media (babes emerging from the wilderness and violent,
dark-skinned Native Americans) with activities Filipinos at the
time were known to enjoy (gambling and patronizing “institutions
of disorderly character” such as pool halls).
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Figure 2
President McKinley washes a dirty Filipino baby in the foreground while clean
Filipino children dress in American clothing.
Reprinted from “The Filipino’s First Bath,” Blac k'n W hite Filipin os in  American Popular Media: 1896-
1907 ,  10 June 1899,  <http://www.bwf.org/pusod/ events/TMPrc8exscy5.htm> (3 December 2002)
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An example of the Filipinos’s bawdiness was their attendance
at taxi-dance halls, where ten cents entitled them to one dance with
a white woman.  As sociologist Edwin B. Almirol reported, the
public was aghast to find out that these “little brown monkeys” (an
obvious play on the phrase, “little brown brothers,” that govern-
ment officials used at the turn of the century) were socializing with
racially pure women.  Their actions were questioned since these
men were “jungle folk” with obviously a “primitive moral code.”
These perceptions were influenced by the past images, which
depicted Filipinos running around the jungles of the Philippines,
unaware of what was right or wrong before the Americans came in
and disciplined them.  The thorough civilizing that they had
endured before their arrival in the United States was clearly not
enough to make them accepted.  Thus the public was warned that
an invasion of Filipinos, the “hordes of little brown men,” had
already begun.22  President Calvin Coolidge cautioned the Ameri-
can public to beware of the “unassimilated alien child [who]
menaces our children, as the alien industrial worker, who has
destruction rather than production in mind, menaces our
industry.”23  Filipinos were stuck with the stereotype that they were
these brown savages, preparing to attack their unsuspecting hosts.
Another image that appeared often during this period and was
influenced by the views from the past was that of the
“unassimilated alien.”  Almirol used this phrase several times
when he wrote about Americans’ views of Filipinos during the late
1920s.  By referring to Filipinos as unassimilated aliens, people at
the time believed that these immigrants were stubborn and
problematic and refused to accept American ideals.  This was the
grown-up version of the surly Filipino child who rejected the
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generous gifts of education, Christianity, and most of all, civiliza-
tion, bestowed upon the Philippine people by the United States.
Though many Americans saw Filipinos with suspicion, fear,
and dislike, not all people felt this way.  Some Americans had what
they considered fairly favorable impressions of these immigrants.
However, most individuals who held seemingly positive percep-
tions of Filipinos often saw them with condescension, and many of
these views were influenced by previous reports made during the
time of the Philippine-American War.  They felt sympathy for their
“brown brothers of the Pacific,” as one woman called them, when
they heard about the plight of the people of the Philippines and
their desire for independence.  And citizens were surprisingly
pleased with the behavior and physical appearance of the Filipinos
they came across.  They observed that the Filipinos were trustwor-
thy and good workers.  Americans were also impressed with the
politeness and dapper appearance of Filipino men who worked in
restaurants and hotels.  One woman said that she “was drawn to
them by their appearance, good looks, and manners.  Their silence
and self-control drew me to them.”24  Apparently many Americans
did not expect Filipinos to act in such a manner, testament to the
fact that they thought of their “little brown brothers” as dark-
skinned, pugnacious creatures, images that were thrusted upon
them earlier in the century.
Why did negative images leave such a lasting impression on
the American public and affect their perceptions twenty years after
they were first published?  There are a few explanations for this.
Many Americans knew very little about the Philippines prior to the
Spanish-American War.  Thus, they were first exposed to Filipinos
by the United States government, which strove to portray Ameri-
can actions in the islands in a positive light, and by the press, the
majority of which catered to the conservative views and framed the
war in terms of “discipline and national honor”.25  For several
28 Historical Perspectives March 2004
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decades, these descriptions would be the only ones supplied to the
American public, so the only way they could understand these
people were through these images.  Until World War II, any other
report from the Philippines simply confirmed the poor conditions
of the islands and the people.  For example, in a 1928 article for
the popular magazine Forum, Katherine Mayo, an expert on Asia
(and a resident of India for several years), commented on the
“malignant cesspool” that was Manila and the natives’ hatred of
“this new foreign devil called Sanitation.”26
These unfavorable reports worked in conjunction with the
sentiment of Americans who were unhappy with the influx of
immigrants coming to America.  Clinging to demeaning and racist
images provided ammunition to their nativist mission to exclude
Filipinos.  Although Philippine immigrants were allowed by the
government to come to America as wards of the state, the public
ultimately saw them as “Orientals.”  Thus, they were subjected to
the same discriminating practices that the Chinese and Japanese
immigrants had faced before the Filipinos arrived in the United
States.  This included the prohibition from owning land, voting,
and becoming citizens.27
The association with other Asians became dangerous for
Filipinos because it stirred-up anti-Asian beliefs.  Many white
agricultural workers feared that they would lose their jobs to the
new wave of immigrants from “the East.”  This sentiment was
especially shared by numbers of people in California, where a
large number of men from the Philippines worked in the fields of
the Central Valley.  The build-up of resentment due to the organi-
zation of farm workers into labor unions and the fact that they
socialized with white women in taxi-dance halls during their free
time led to vigilantism and riots.  One well-known riot broke out
in 1930 in Watsonville.  During a four-day attack, mobs numbering
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up to seven hundred chased Filipinos down the streets and attacked
and shot at them randomly, killing twenty-two-year old Fermin
Tobera28  The next few years were tumultuous for Philippine
immigrants since they ran into trouble merely by participating in
everyday activities.  “In many ways it was a crime to be a Filipino
in California,” observed the famous Filipino-American writer
Carlos Bulosan.29  The actions of the government and press
certainly did not make the situation any easier for these men.
Originating from newspapers, magazines, and Congressional
records, the idea that Filipinos were savages that deserved
maltreatment permeated the minds of the white American public.
Obviously this is not the only case in United States history in
which a group of people were discriminated against and faced
maltreatment.  However, despite several studies on many dimen-
sions of Philippine-American relations, little has been done to dig
deep into the origins of the initial reactions to Filipinos in Amer-
ica.  After exploring the circumstances in which the United States
entered the Philippines and sought to civilize its inhabitants and
the reasons that ignited the violence against Filipinos in the 1930s,
one can see that events from the earlier period had a tremendous
impact on what happened during the later period.  Newspapers and
government documents promoted their actions in the islands as
necessary because, as they successfully convinced Americans,
these were a surly people in need of the guidance of the United
States.  Without any previous knowledge of the native Filipinos,
these were the images that came to mind when citizens thought of
the Filipinos.  The first large wave of emigrants from the Philip-
pines to the United States during the 1920s and 30s faced the brunt
of the abuse and violence from a public that could not help but
30 Historical Perspectives March 2004
hearken back to the press and governments’ images from the past
when confronted by these foreigners.  Although relations between
not just recent immigrants but also those who arrived during the
beginning of the twentieth century and Americans have drastically
improved (though some may argue that complete acceptance has
yet to be achieved), the study of the origins of discrimination
against Filipinos should not be ignored in order to prevent such an
occurrence to them or any other immigrant group in the United
States from happening again.
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The San Francisco “White Night” Riots of 1979
Bruce Martinez
The morning of November 27, 1978 was a quiet one in San
Francisco. The quiet was soon shattered as a devastating story
broke throughout the city. There had been a double murder in city
hall, and both the mayor and a supervisor had been assassinated.
The police soon announced the suspect was Dan White, a former
supervisor, police officer and fireman. Mayor George Moscone
and supervisor Harvey Milk, the first openly gay man elected to
public office in the United States, were the victims.1
White was soon apprehended, and the city entered a difficult
trial period that in many ways tore the city in two. Milk and
Moscone represented liberal San Francisco; Milk was the most
prominent gay leader in the city, and Moscone had time and again
sided with liberal causes.2 White represented the conservative
forces within the city, specifically the police department and
members of the working class.3
White’s defense centered on psychological and moral argu-
ment and ultimately it was argued that he was of a diminished
capacity at the time of the murders. In addition to this, White was
portrayed as an honest decent man who was incapable of cold
blooded first degree murder. This is best seen in Douglas
Schmidt’s opening arguments: “Good people, fine people, with
fine backgrounds, simply don’t kill people in cold blood.”4
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Schmidt’s combination of psychological and moral arguments led
the jury to a verdict of double manslaughter instead of the much
anticipated double first degree murder. White was sentenced to
eight years in prison.5
The night the verdict was read there was a large scale riot
within the gay community.  By the late 1970s the gay population
in San Francisco was estimated at close to 150,000.  This commu-
nity historically had been large in San Francisco because the city
had become a dumping point for men rejected from the armed
services for homosexuality in World War Two. A march on city
hall turned violent with over one hundred injuries reported, twelve
police cars burned, and nearly one million dollars in damage done
to city hall and the largely gay Castro neighborhood.6
The perceived absurdity of the verdict triggered the riots, but
there were several other factors that also lead to the disturbance.
Conventional wisdom, which states that the largely peaceful gay
community had a spontaneous evening of anger, misses the
multiple reasons behind the riot. There were major political and
social forces that came to a boiling point that evening. The
writings on the murders, the trial, and on Milk and Moscone
largely gloss over the complex reasons for the riots, seemingly
ignoring the historical evidence that suggests a deeper reason for
what happened.
The riots on the evening of May 21, 1979 occurred both as a
reaction to the verdict in the Dan White double homicide case and
also because the murder of mayor George Moscone changed the
balance of power within the city’s police force. Earlier gay rights
marches and vigils had been held without police intervention and
violence. What made this night different were three things:  Police
Chief Charles Gain had lost control of his rank and file officers
following Moscone’s death, there had been an upswing in violence
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and harassment against the gay community in the time since the
city hall murders, and Harvey Milk was not available to keep the
peace within the gay community as he had during earlier marches.
One reason for the violence during the riot was the beleaguered
San Francisco police department. There is ample evidence to
suggest that some members of the police department were
sympathetic to Dan White. After he was arrested on the day of the
murder’s, several police officers came up to him while he sat in
custody and nodded their approval, some went as far as to pat him
on the back.7 While there is no historical evidence to support the
widespread rumor that the police and fire departments raised
$100,000 for White’s defense, the mere proliferation of such a
rumor suggests a certain support for White among law enforce-
ment. This support was cemented when the eventual verdict was
read over the police radio band and several officers began to sing
“Danny Boy,” a popular Irish song, in celebration of White only
being convicted of manslaughter.8
Police Chief Gain was also hugely unpopular with the rank and
file police force. He had been appointed by Moscone in early 1975
to clean up and unify the department. Some of his first moves were
to ban any drinking of alcohol while officers were on duty, to take
down a large American flag in the hall of justice that he felt could
alienate the city’s international population, and order squad cars
painted a modest sky blue and white instead of the traditional black
and white. These largely symbolic changes still irked the general
police force. Gain’s most notorious change was to stop the
enforcement of small infractions against minority communities.9
For the gay community this meant not being arrested and
harassed for infractions such as blocking a sidewalk. Harvey Milk
commented on this in an unpublished manuscript for a political
speech in 1974: “When the Geary Theater empties the sidewalks
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are impossible to pass. When the Police Athletic League circus
empties the sidewalks are chaos. These cases are fine. Yet when
the gays leave the bars at the 2 a.m. closing time, we find that
some of our police object to it and make arrests for blocking the
sidewalks.”10
Harassing the gay community had been a near tradition within
the SFPD, who were largely conservative Catholics with a built-in
sense of homophobia.11 While Gain’s easing up on minor infrac-
tions gave the gay community a new sense of freedom, his stance
on homosexual officers gave them a new ally. When asked by a
gay newspaper what he would do if an officer came out, Gain
responded, “If I had a gay policeman who came out I would
support him one hundred percent.”12 
This statement was confirmed to the San Francisco Examiner
in a story appearing on April 18, 1976. In reference to a closeted
gay police officer coming out, Gain said, “It will be hard for them,
I know that, but they’ll have the full support of the police chief.13
Soon graffiti saying “Gain is a Fruit” began appearing in station
houses and in the Hall of Justice. As early as July 1977, the
leadership within the police officer’s association were calling for
Gain’s removal from his post.14 The opposition against him within
the department was so strong that there were some officers who
may have conspired to murder him while he was off duty. An
officer with the nickname Joe the Pig had said to Margo St. James,
a famous prostitution union organizer that a plot was in the works,
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“It would be easy…Gain leads an active social life, remains
unarmed when he was off duty, and does not keep a bodyguard.”15
Gain was protected from being removed from office despite
the dissent from officers below him because he had the unwavering
support of Moscone, who had appointed him and was committed
to the liberal causes Gain was espousing. Moscone wanted the
police force integrated and had the political support of San
Francisco gays, who treasured the calm within their community
during Gain’s tenure. Wayne Friday, in a column in the Bay Area
Reporter, captures the support held by Gain:  “Would one reader
in the gay community tell me when the gay community has had a
better friend as the top cop in town?”16
Moscone, who had received near unanimous support from the
gay community during his 1975 election, was not about to remove
Gain from his post.17 Upon Moscone’s death Gain became the
ultimate lame duck. The new mayor, Dianne Feinstein, had
repeatedly criticized him during his time as chief from her position
of president of the Board of Supervisors.18 Even though Feinstein
pledged to keep Gain through what would have been the rest of
Moscone’s time in office, the writing was on the wall for Gain and
the police department.19
Without Moscone behind him, Gain lacked the political power
to hold his officers in line. Assuming that Gain was on his way out,
the rank and file officers took this as an invitation to revert back to
previous tactics used against the gay community. The old guard
within the police department would be able to operate as they had
before the new rules had been implemented.
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Quickly  reports of violence against the gay community began
to surface again. Gay journalist Bruce Pettit commented on this in
a column for the Bay Area Reporter which attempted to explain the
reasons behind the riots: “Almost immediately after the murders,
there was an upsurge of increased police harassment and street
attacks on gays, which bred anger within gays.”20
Further evidence of this upswing in enforcement of petty laws
is found in the March 21, 1979 San Francisco Chronicle. An
article describes Gain being booed at a meeting of the Golden Gate
Business Association because the police recently attempted to
close six gay bookstores and theaters. The owners of the establish-
ments were charged with operating public nuisances.21 Events like
these tore at the fabric of the gay community; they hindered gays
in their pursuit of happiness and gave them a reason to be angry
with the police department. Within the Castro, the center of gay
politics and culture, there was considerable outcry against the
actions of the police.22  
The problem was further exacerbated when the police raided
a lesbian bar called Peg’s Place. Ten police officers, some on duty,
some off duty, ran into the bar and shouted, “Let’s get the dykes.”
They began to beat the bars owner and several patrons with their
nightsticks. There were no arrests and the officers had covered
their badge numbers which made prosecuting them difficult. Gay
newspapers heavily reported the incident while the two city dailies
ignored it.  A news article that ran in the Sentinel in May 1979
reported, “Michael Kelly is accused of physically assaulting the
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bar’s owner, Erlinda Symers by wrestling her to the floor with a
headlock.”23
This incident of violence was among the first that saw
members of the gay community begin to fight back against the
police: “A melee broke out between the men and women patrons
who rushed to the bar employee’s defense, beating the intruders
with pool cues.”24  Previous to this night, gays had almost always
docilely submitted to police instructions and violence.25 The pre-
riot move towards active resistance undercuts the argument that the
gay response during the riot was surprising in its violence. Gays
had already begun to oppose police intimidation tactics violently,
and there is ample evidence of growing resentment within the gay
community. 
The best example of this bitterness was the afternoon of May
12, 1979, nine days before the riots. A gay man was hanging fliers
on telephone poles outside of a gay bar in the Castro. A beat
officer approached him and stated that tacking up posters violated
a city ordinance. He handcuffed the man and called for the paddy
wagon. Within minutes a mob of gay men had pored out of the
bars and stores and surrounded the officer. The officer who was
being taunted and jeered radioed for backup and soon a half dozen
police cars had arrived. By this time the mob had grown to three
thousand people who were throwing change at the police and
chanting, “Dan White was a cop.” The paddy wagon arrived and
inched its way through the crowd, and as it did some individuals
slashed at its tires. The police quickly vacated the scene, leaving
the throng with no one to shout at.26
38 Historical Perspectives March 2004
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This second instance of gay resistance to the police suggests
the speed with which the gay community could move out of the
bars and shops and onto the streets to respond in anger. The
chanting of “Dan White was a cop” demonstrates the angry
association made between the police force and the man who
murdered the unofficial mayor of Castro Street.
After an earlier increase in police violence and persecution
against gays that followed the double murder, the gay community
was now beginning to find its will to fight back. The incident
described above would certainly discourage any one officer from
enforcing minor violations of the law in an unfair manner. In the
weeks leading up to the riots the gay community reached a critical
mass of anger and belligerence. What was lacking was any kind of
leadership to direct the growing anger. This became most apparent
the night of the riot. 
Gays had marched on city hall during other crises in the late
1970s. These marches had always ended in a peaceful way. The
most striking example of a gay march that could have ended in
violence was the Orange Tuesday march on June 7, 1977. After
Dade County Florida had repealed a gay rights law by a two to one
margin, a large crowd of gays estimated at over five thousand
gathered on Castro street and began to chant militant slogans
calling for gay rights nationwide.27 The police, shocked over the
sudden appearance of so many homosexuals feared a riot and
called upon Milk to calm the crowd. He led them on a lengthy
march which ended in a peaceful sit down in the middle of the
Castro and Market Street intersection. The gay community had
turned out in force but had remained peaceful due to Milk’s
leadership.28
If the gay community was ever to have a violent riot it would
have been on this night. The Dade county gay rights referendum
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was being watched around the country and its defeat was a real
blow to gay rights organizers and their followers.29 Milk was able
to steward the marchers through the city and provide peaceful
leadership. He was even able to portray the march as a completely
peaceful one to the newspapers when in reality it was on the brink
of turning violent.  He stated to the San Francisco Examiner:
“What’s happening is an out poring of love and warmth for all gay
people.”30 This account differs from the one given in Randy
Shilts’s The Mayor of Castro Street, which implies a much greater
threat of violence: “For three hours, Harvey led the crowd over a
five-mile course, worried that any pause might see that first rock
hurled through a window or at a cop.”31 
Milk had managed to bolster the gay community in the
newspaper and to also lead it through the crisis during the march.
His leadership was seen in similar marches up until his death. The
night of the riots there was not a capable gay leader to step forward
and keep the night peaceful. Milk’s successor to the Board of
Supervisors, Harry Britt, attempted to quell the violent crowd
which gathered at city hall after the verdict had been read. He
shouted “Harvey, remember Harvey Milk. He’d be ashamed of
us.”32 Britt was soon shouted down and the riot commenced. 
The moment the gay community began the assault on city hall
was captured in the next day’s San Francisco Chronicle. “‘We are
not Dan White! No violence tonight!’ somebody cried through a
bullhorn. ‘Bullshit!’ came the response, then the sound of glass
breaking, and a cheer went up from the crowd.”33
After city hall had been heavily damaged, the rioters eventu-
ally moved to Castro Street where police officers descended on the
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gay bars in the late night hours.  As they then began arriving they
were greeted with thrown bottles and more jeers. The night  ended
only after the police had raided the Elephant Walk, a bisexual bar
on Castro and 18th Streets. While there they brutally beat patrons
and “won” a figurative battle. Warren Hinckle wrote in the
Chronicle the day after the riots, “In the corner of my eye I could
see cops chasing gays with sticks. Captain Jeffries put on a firm
jaw: ‘We lost the battle at city hall. We aren’t going to lose this
one.’”34 The price of winning the battle was steep for some
members of the Castro who suffered brutal beatings at the hands
of the officers who were not following any standard protocol. “The
police swooped into the bar, swinging and beating people. They
were down there to crack a few heads open,” bar patron Donald
Sagim said. Sagim had his right ear and chin split open, suffered
five broken ribs, and a partially collapsed lung.35
The violence at city hall and on Castro Street occurred both as
a spontaneous angry reaction to the perceived injustice of the
White verdict but also for other deeper reasons. Gays had become
used to a relative amount of calm in their social lives after Gain
had been appointed police chief by mayor Moscone. The random
police violence had almost stopped. Within a period of six months,
from November 1978 to May 1979, the gay community’s most
prominent leader had been assassinated, police had stepped up
persecution and violence to near unprecedented levels, and no one
stepped into the leadership vacuum left by Milk. There was much
to be angry about.
If Gain had been able to maintain control of his police force
and the violent attacks and persecution had not immediately
45
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 9 2004
Published by Scholar Commons, 2004
The White Night Riots 39
      29Shilts, 159.
      30Steve Rubenstein, “Defiant Gays March in S.F.” San Francisco
Examiner, 8 June 1977, sec A, final edition.
      31Shilts, 159.
      32Shilts, 330.
      33Katy Butler, “Anatomy of a Gay Riot,” San Francisco Chronicle, 22 May
1979, sec. A, final edition.
was being watched around the country and its defeat was a real
blow to gay rights organizers and their followers.29 Milk was able
to steward the marchers through the city and provide peaceful
leadership. He was even able to portray the march as a completely
peaceful one to the newspapers when in reality it was on the brink
of turning violent.  He stated to the San Francisco Examiner:
“What’s happening is an out poring of love and warmth for all gay
people.”30 This account differs from the one given in Randy
Shilts’s The Mayor of Castro Street, which implies a much greater
threat of violence: “For three hours, Harvey led the crowd over a
five-mile course, worried that any pause might see that first rock
hurled through a window or at a cop.”31 
Milk had managed to bolster the gay community in the
newspaper and to also lead it through the crisis during the march.
His leadership was seen in similar marches up until his death. The
night of the riots there was not a capable gay leader to step forward
and keep the night peaceful. Milk’s successor to the Board of
Supervisors, Harry Britt, attempted to quell the violent crowd
which gathered at city hall after the verdict had been read. He
shouted “Harvey, remember Harvey Milk. He’d be ashamed of
us.”32 Britt was soon shouted down and the riot commenced. 
The moment the gay community began the assault on city hall
was captured in the next day’s San Francisco Chronicle. “‘We are
not Dan White! No violence tonight!’ somebody cried through a
bullhorn. ‘Bullshit!’ came the response, then the sound of glass
breaking, and a cheer went up from the crowd.”33
After city hall had been heavily damaged, the rioters eventu-
ally moved to Castro Street where police officers descended on the
40 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      34Warren Hinckle, “How Cops Waded Into Castro Street,” San Francisco
Chronicle, 22 May 1979, sec. A, final edition.
      35Bill Soiffer, “The Sorry Saga at Elephant Walk Bar,” San Francisco
Chronicle, 22 May 1979, sec. A, final edition; also “The Times of Harvey
Milk,” produced by Robert Epstein, 88 Minutes. Black Sand Productions,
1984, 1 videocassette.
gay bars in the late night hours.  As they then began arriving they
were greeted with thrown bottles and more jeers. The night  ended
only after the police had raided the Elephant Walk, a bisexual bar
on Castro and 18th Streets. While there they brutally beat patrons
and “won” a figurative battle. Warren Hinckle wrote in the
Chronicle the day after the riots, “In the corner of my eye I could
see cops chasing gays with sticks. Captain Jeffries put on a firm
jaw: ‘We lost the battle at city hall. We aren’t going to lose this
one.’”34 The price of winning the battle was steep for some
members of the Castro who suffered brutal beatings at the hands
of the officers who were not following any standard protocol. “The
police swooped into the bar, swinging and beating people. They
were down there to crack a few heads open,” bar patron Donald
Sagim said. Sagim had his right ear and chin split open, suffered
five broken ribs, and a partially collapsed lung.35
The violence at city hall and on Castro Street occurred both as
a spontaneous angry reaction to the perceived injustice of the
White verdict but also for other deeper reasons. Gays had become
used to a relative amount of calm in their social lives after Gain
had been appointed police chief by mayor Moscone. The random
police violence had almost stopped. Within a period of six months,
from November 1978 to May 1979, the gay community’s most
prominent leader had been assassinated, police had stepped up
persecution and violence to near unprecedented levels, and no one
stepped into the leadership vacuum left by Milk. There was much
to be angry about.
If Gain had been able to maintain control of his police force
and the violent attacks and persecution had not immediately
46
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 9 [2004], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol9/iss1/1
The White Night Riots 41
restarted after the assassinations, the violence of the White Night
Riots would have been mitigated. If a real leader had stepped
forward to lead the community, there may have been a peaceful
march instead of a violent protest. These forces all played together
to bring the gay community to a critical level of anger that boiled
over against both the police force and city hall, the very essence of
San Francisco.
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Radical Self:
Greenpeace and Earth First! Identity in the 1980s
Maggie Penkert
The images of women and men in tie-dye gathering at outdoor
rallies, climbing trees about to be cut down, or moving their rafts
in front of whaling harpoons are familiar after three decades of
environmental activists gaining headlines with their extreme earth-
saving efforts.  Since the 1970s there has been a new radicalism
within environmentalism that has taken beliefs about nature and
actions to save it beyond previously recognized environmental
protection measures.  While the radicals created divisions in the
larger movement between themselves and “mainstream” environ-
mentalists, they had divisions of their own as well, based on the
degree of the groups’ radicalism.1  Greenpeace and Earth First! are
two groups that, during the 1980s, demonstrated these differences.
A difference in the extreme ideologies between Greenpeace
and Earth First! led to some differences in their actions, which
prompts the question, why did the groups’ basic ideologies differ?
One explanation is that Earth First! was more ideologically and
actively radical than Greenpeace because of a difference in the
self-identities of their members.  Generally Earth First!ers
identified themselves as insignificant, while Greenpeace members
generally identified themselves as significant in the grand order of
life.  Essentially, the self-perceived modesty of Earth First!ers
pushed them to radical limits that Greenpeace members, with their
self-perceived importance, fell short of achieving. 
The differences that separated groups on the scale of radical-
ism, like Earth First! and Greenpeace, have been the focus of
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studies that described such differences and that explored how
dissatisfaction within environmentalism prompted new radical
groups. 2  Two areas of scholarship have developed about human-
ity’s place in relation to nature from a psychological perspective
and an ecological perspective – ecopsychology and deep ecology.
Ecopsychology, a field of study that developed in the 1960s,
believed that humans’ psychological health depended on their
connection with nature.3  Expanding on this principle,
ecopsychologists believed that humans needed to recognize
themselves as members of nature and not as dominant over nature.4
 Deep ecology also recognized the importance of humans’ roles
within nature.5  Deep ecology was a philosophy, a movement, and
a way of life that gave nature its own intrinsic value, while
discarding the idea of nature’s worth determined by its usefulness
to humans.6  Based on an understanding that humans are simply
one element in the natural order, deep ecology demanded that
people live with the least possible negative impact on the environ-
ment.7  
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What has not received much attention, even taking into
account scholarship in the fields of ecopsychology and deep
ecology, is the relation of the activists’ personal identities to the
extent of their radicalism.  If human psychology in general is
related to nature, that logic can be taken a step further and applied
to individuals – human self-identity is related to nature.  One’s
understanding of one’s place within nature determines how one
will interact with (or on behalf of) nature.  The differing identities
of the environmental activists provided personal ideological
boundaries for environmentalism and tactical boundaries for
individual actions.  Greenpeace and Earth First! members had
slightly different personal identities that determined their ideolo-
gies and tactics, which were in turn different in some ways.
However, before discussing the two groups’ ideologies and tactics
any further, some background to their creation and structure is
necessary for a basic understanding of each group.
Some Canadian and American environmental and peace
activists created Greenpeace in 1970, to protest the United States’
testing of nuclear weapons in the Aleutian Islands by sailing to the
area, in hopes that their physical presence would deter the detona-
tions.8  Unsuccessful in their first attempt to stop the nuclear
testing in the Aleutians, the group persevered.  Although
Greenpeace started mainly as an anti-nuclear movement, the group
soon expanded its focus to environmental issues in general.9
Although in size and budget Greenpeace is now considered a huge
organization, it has kept its founding spirit of localized protests
alive.10 
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In the case of Greenpeace, a specific action gave birth to the
group.  However, in the case of Earth First!, it was a few people’s
ideals about the direction of environmentalism, as opposed to a
single event, that started the group.  The basic story of Earth
First!’s founding is that five friends dissatisfied with the effective-
ness of contemporary environmental groups (Greenpeace in-
cluded), and frustrated with recent governmental lack of protection
for wilderness, decided to start a group that would not compromise
on environmental issues.11  One of Earth First!’s founders, Dave
Foreman, expressed his idea for the group to create a space within
the environmental movement, and specifically within the radical
branch, that had never before existed.  In an article published in
1981, Foreman said, “It was time for a new joker in the deck: a
militant, uncompromising group unafraid to say what needed to be
said or to back it up with stronger actions than the established
organizations were willing to take.”12  Earth First!, as the founding
members saw it, was self-consciously anti-organizational.  As co-
founder Foreman said regarding the organization-phobia of the
group, “We felt that if we took on the organization of the industrial
state, we would soon accept their anthropocentric paradigm.”13
Instead of an organizational hierarchy, Earth First! consisted of a
central group of thirteen women and men throughout the United
States who served as the group’s only kind of leadership.  While
people in these informal positions helped to keep the Earth First!
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movement alive in at least a vague coherence, the group’s soul lay
in individual motivation prompting action.14 
The self-identities of Greenpeace and Earth First! members
influencing the degree of radicalism in their respective movements
is more evident in the basic ideologies of each group than in the
groups’ creations and structures.  As radical environmental groups,
Greenpeace and Earth First! had important ideological similarities.
However, just as the self-identities of the members differed
slightly, so too did the ideologies.  Greenpeace philosophy focused
on the human responsibility for environmental destruction,
education as a step towards more eco-friendly practices, and saving
nature for future generations of humans.  Earth First! shared the
belief that humans were responsible for the degradation, but they
were very pessimistic about the ability of humans to change, and
they focused on saving nature not for their descendants, but for
nature alone.  These differences in ideology between the two
groups are a result of differences in the self-identities of the
members (the significance of Greenpeacers versus the insignifi-
cance of Earth First!ers).
Greenpeace believed that humans were responsible for
environmental destruction because of their greed and ignorance of
the repercussions of their actions.  Greenpeace therefore also
believed that if it could create an awareness of the (sometimes
indirect) consequences of human actions on the environment, this
transformation in public consciousness would be an essential step
toward ending environmental destruction.15  Paul Wapner, who has
written many articles about Greenpeace, summarized the group’s
environmental protection goals, “At the most general level then,
the first step toward protecting the earth is to change the way vast
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numbers of people understand it.”16  Greenpeace also conceived of
its role as a group of environmental defenders that would help the
environment through its members’ direct actions.  This was
evident in their mission statement from 1992, “Greenpeace will
both personally bear witness to atrocities against life and take
direct action to prevent them.”17  Greenpeace members believed
that they held the power within themselves to fight environmental
destruction successfully because they knew the specifics of its
occurrences (bearing witness), which suggests a self-identity of
strength and importance.
In 1976, Greenpeace published its “Declaration of Interdepen-
dence,” which explained that although it supported the ecocentric
view of deep ecology in which nature has an intrinsic value, the
group also acknowledged that its efforts in saving nature was for
human benefit – namely, to prevent the human species’ extinction.
 The Declaration stated that while nature must be saved for its own
sake, action must be taken to preserve nature “or our children will
be denied their future.”18  In the “Declaration of Interdependence,”
the self-identity of Greenpeace members was evidently significant
because of the extent to which human welfare was as important to
maintain as environmental protection.  Also, for people to see
themselves as caretakers with such an essential responsibility as
maintaining the natural balance of life, they would have to
conceive of themselves individually as significant beings.
The general ideology of Earth First! argued that the inevitable
seeds of nature’s destruction lay in the modern forms of industrial
western civilization.  The general anthropocentric views of these
societies placed more value on humans than other forms of life,
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which Earth First! regarded as the reason humans allowed
widespread destruction of nature to take place.19  Earth First! found
another source of environmental harm in the combination of this
dangerous anthropocentric world-view with the destructive
potential of modern technological practices exploiting natural
resources.20  Earth First! ideology focused on all the negative
elements of human society that led to environmental destruction
and believed that humanity in general lacked the capacity to live
in harmony with the environment.  In placing such limits on the
human character, Earth First!ers self-identities, as members of this
handicapped humankind, could not have been very positive.
Earth First! members saw their group’s role as taking part in
direct actions that halted environmental destruction in any form,
for however short a time.  With their no-compromise stance, they
did not necessarily believe that they could win every time, but their
goal was to not back down from any fight for the environment.
Foreman expressed this unwillingness to concede in an article,
when he wrote, “Perhaps it is a hopeless quest.  But is that
relevant?  Is that important?  No, what is important is that one who
loves Earth can do no less.”21 In this excerpt from Foreman’s
writings, he seemed to believe in the probable ineffectiveness of
humans to really achieve protection for wilderness on the scale that
was needed.  In this view, humans, Earth First! members included,
did not necessarily have the power to save their world.
In addition to direct actions on behalf of protecting nature,
Earth First! saw salvation for nature in the end of civilization as
they knew it.  They advocated a return to more primitive lifestyle,
in which there was little technology, no capitalism, and no
government other than the social structures provided by tribal
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systems of living.22  This belief, referred to as Neo-Primitivism,
established the idea that “civilized” humanity, in the western
understanding of the term, was incapable of living in harmony with
the environment.23  Earth First!ers’ belief that the primitive
lifestyle, modeled after indigenous tribes of people around the
world, could be human and nature’s saving grace, shows that they
had faith in at least small groups of humans.  However, Earth
First!ers considered that the possibility that humans would destroy
the earth and bring about their own demise was more likely than
transforming human civilization.  This pessimistic view of people
included a lack of faith in themselves, to a degree, because they
had no confidence in their own abilities to aid in human society’s
necessary transformations.
In the collective Earth First! ideology, there is also an empha-
sis on nature-based spirituality as a component of the return to the
primitive lifestyle.  Nature-based spirituality is important to Earth
First! ideology in two ways – it affirms the need for humans to
maintain a deep (emotional, spiritual) bond with the earth in all of
its natural forms, and it opposes the monotheistic religions that
were seen as a source of civilization’s evils.24  The monotheistic
religious traditions, from the Earth First! point of view, were
dangerous to the environment because their faiths were partially
based on the anthropocentric belief that God created the earth for
humans to use.25  In contrast, nature-based spirituality believes in
human existence as equal in importance to all life forms.  When
people’s spiritual faith, which is essentially personal views on the
universal order, denies that they have a “chosen” role over other
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living things, their senses of self-identity would probably include
a sense of personal insignificance.
As ideologies justify actions, the tactics of Greenpeace and
Earth First! expanded upon their guiding principles.  Greenpeace
and Earth First! qualified for radicalism due to their extreme
tactics, in addition to their ecocentric ideologies.  Both groups
were unique in that they were the first to add direct actions to the
environmental movement.  Greenpeace direct actions had the dual
goals of gaining attention to educate people and attempting to stop
ecological destruction.  Earth First!’s direct actions, on the other
hand, had the main goal of halting environmentally damaging acts,
even if only temporarily. Other differences, which made Earth
First! the more radical of the two groups, were the ultimate objects
of their efforts (as generally either animals or non-animals) and
their policies on the use of violence.  
As the first of the two groups, early Greenpeace actions
established a new direction for the environmental movement by
using direct actions, physically placing themselves in danger as a
form of protest to stop environmentally destructive activities.26  By
the early 1980s, Greenpeace had established three major campaign
categories as the focus of their efforts – nuclear disarmament,
endangered wildlife, and toxic waste pollution.27  The anti-nuclear
campaign, in addition to their first direct action, included other
trips to weapons test sites and illegally posting radioactive warning
signs along highways to protest nuclear shipments.28  The cam-
paign for protecting endangered species was mostly focused on
ending whaling and the killing of baby seals for their fur.  In most
cases, the activists would place themselves between whales and
55
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 9 2004
Published by Scholar Commons, 2004
Radical Self 49
      22Kassman, 52-53.
      23Kassman, 22-23.
      24Bron Taylor, Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global Emergence
of Radical and Popular Environmentalism (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1995), 16.
      25Taylor, Ecological Resistance Movements, 16.
systems of living.22  This belief, referred to as Neo-Primitivism,
established the idea that “civilized” humanity, in the western
understanding of the term, was incapable of living in harmony with
the environment.23  Earth First!ers’ belief that the primitive
lifestyle, modeled after indigenous tribes of people around the
world, could be human and nature’s saving grace, shows that they
had faith in at least small groups of humans.  However, Earth
First!ers considered that the possibility that humans would destroy
the earth and bring about their own demise was more likely than
transforming human civilization.  This pessimistic view of people
included a lack of faith in themselves, to a degree, because they
had no confidence in their own abilities to aid in human society’s
necessary transformations.
In the collective Earth First! ideology, there is also an empha-
sis on nature-based spirituality as a component of the return to the
primitive lifestyle.  Nature-based spirituality is important to Earth
First! ideology in two ways – it affirms the need for humans to
maintain a deep (emotional, spiritual) bond with the earth in all of
its natural forms, and it opposes the monotheistic religions that
were seen as a source of civilization’s evils.24  The monotheistic
religious traditions, from the Earth First! point of view, were
dangerous to the environment because their faiths were partially
based on the anthropocentric belief that God created the earth for
humans to use.25  In contrast, nature-based spirituality believes in
human existence as equal in importance to all life forms.  When
people’s spiritual faith, which is essentially personal views on the
universal order, denies that they have a “chosen” role over other
50 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      26Rik Scarce, Eco-Warriors: Understanding the Radical Environmental
Movement (Chicago: Nobic Press, 1990), 47-48.
      27Robin Toner, “A Gadfly for Environmental Causes,”  New York Times, 25
September 1985, sec. A.
      28“Fake Signs Annoy Four States,” San Francisco Chronicle, 21 October
1981.
living things, their senses of self-identity would probably include
a sense of personal insignificance.
As ideologies justify actions, the tactics of Greenpeace and
Earth First! expanded upon their guiding principles.  Greenpeace
and Earth First! qualified for radicalism due to their extreme
tactics, in addition to their ecocentric ideologies.  Both groups
were unique in that they were the first to add direct actions to the
environmental movement.  Greenpeace direct actions had the dual
goals of gaining attention to educate people and attempting to stop
ecological destruction.  Earth First!’s direct actions, on the other
hand, had the main goal of halting environmentally damaging acts,
even if only temporarily. Other differences, which made Earth
First! the more radical of the two groups, were the ultimate objects
of their efforts (as generally either animals or non-animals) and
their policies on the use of violence.  
As the first of the two groups, early Greenpeace actions
established a new direction for the environmental movement by
using direct actions, physically placing themselves in danger as a
form of protest to stop environmentally destructive activities.26  By
the early 1980s, Greenpeace had established three major campaign
categories as the focus of their efforts – nuclear disarmament,
endangered wildlife, and toxic waste pollution.27  The anti-nuclear
campaign, in addition to their first direct action, included other
trips to weapons test sites and illegally posting radioactive warning
signs along highways to protest nuclear shipments.28  The cam-
paign for protecting endangered species was mostly focused on
ending whaling and the killing of baby seals for their fur.  In most
cases, the activists would place themselves between whales and
56
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 9 [2004], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol9/iss1/1
Radical Self 51
      29Bob Hunter, “Taking on the Goliaths of Doom,” in Radical
Environmentalism: Philosophy and Tactics, ed. Peter List (Belmont, Cal.:
Wadsworth, Inc., 1998), 140.
      30List, 4-5.
      31Shaiko, 98;  Scarce, 54.
whaling ships, or between hunters and seals.29  In each of the three
campaign areas, Greenpeace direct actions are examples of the new
forms of protest that they initiated into the environmentalist
repertoire.  They took the movement’s earlier tactics of working
through legal and governmental channels a step further by using
their own bodies in protest to actually stop, for however short a
time, the practices that harmed the environment. The focus of most
Greenpeace campaigns and direct actions was on either the
survival of their fellow humans or the survival of other mammals.
While they believed in the intrinsic value of nature, their actions
suggested a sense of hierarchy in choosing what nature to protect.
Mammals (humans included) seemed to be at the top of their order,
suggesting a sense of self as relatively significant. 
Greenpeace tactics often included the extreme decisions of
members to put their own lives at risk (of either legal punishment
or physical harm) in pursuit of environmental protection.  How-
ever, Greenpeace leadership drew a definite line between what
they viewed as acceptable and unacceptable direct actions, and that
line excluded violence of any kind.  Direct actions in the environ-
mental movement that used violence, whether perpetrated on
humans or inanimate objects, was referred to as ecotage (or
environmental sabotage).  This form of protest developed in the
1970s, and while rarely planned against humans, sabotage of
machinery and other equipment had the potential side effect of
harming people.30  Greenpeace officially took a firm stance against
ecotage of any kind, predicated upon the belief that violence
towards humans, even in the very indirect form of violence against
their tools for living and working, was unacceptable.31 
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Earth First! tactics were different from Greenpeace tactics
because the focus of most Earth First! direct actions focused on
wilderness.32  While the survival and welfare of animal species was
an aspect of their battles, Earth First!ers were usually more
devoted to the protection of natural land than anything.  Habitats
were so important that members were willing to risk their lives for
non-animals and even non-living things, such as the natural flow
of rivers.  Earth First! direct actions along these lines included
chaining themselves to machinery used in logging and in building
roads or similar development projects.  Earth First!ers also
attempted to halt logging by chaining themselves to or climbing up
the trees that were to be cut down.33
Earth First! attempted to increase eco-awareness, although it
pessimistically viewed the ability of education to address environ-
mental problems adequately.  They used their direct actions,
traveling road shows, and various works of guerilla theater to
attract attention to their cause.34  Guerilla theater, which relied on
zany Earth First! humor, involved activists dressing up as animals
whose habitats were threatened and then interacting with the
general public on the animals’ behalf.  One example of Earth First!
guerilla theater occurred at Yellowstone National Park in 1985,
when a group of Earth First!ers dressed up in bear costumes and
entered a hotel and a restaurant, asking for rooms to stay in and
food because their natural areas of habitat were being reduced by
development and tourism.35  This kind of humor was continually
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a part of Earth First! direct actions as they bordered on making fun
of themselves.  Foreman’s emphasis on the importance of humor
to the movement suggests that Earth First!ers were always careful
never to take themselves too seriously.  In an article about Earth
First!’s goals, co-founder Foreman said, “Not only does humor
preserve individual and group sanity, it retards hubris, the major
cause of environmental rape, and it is also an effective weapon.”36
This tendency to take oneself lightly suggests an identity that did
not regard the self as very significant, and in fact, also views the
feeling of self-importance as dangerous.
The other major element of direct actions that separated Earth
First! from Greenpeace was its acceptance of ecotage as a legiti-
mate practice in environmental protection.  Earth First! did not
indiscriminately support all forms of ectoage, but the founding
members, especially Foreman, believed in it as a powerful tool
when used appropriately.  For Greenpeace, non-violence was part
of their overall strategy – each action was planned to be non-
violent, whereas for Earth First!, non-violence was a tactic – only
to be employed when it was more beneficial than violent
methods.37  Specific examples of Earth First! ecotage included
illegally pulling up survey stakes, pouring foreign substances into
the gas tanks of mobile machinery, and tree-spiking.38  Foreman,
because of his regard for ecotage (which he referred to as
“monkeywrenching”), wrote guidelines for its use, simultaneously
to endorse it as potentially effective and warn of the dangers if not
carefully implemented.  Foreman did not label ecotage as violence,
because it was only supposed to be directed at inanimate objects.39
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Earth First!’s decision to use ecotage as a tactic illustrates that they
were prepared to engage themselves in the fight to oppose
environmental destruction to a greater degree than Greenpeace
members. In their acceptance of violence as a viable method, they
further placed the welfare of nature above their own.  Their
willingness to commit violence for the sake of wilderness in its
non-animal forms suggests once again that their lack of concern
for the human species reflected a personal identity as insignificant
in the natural world.
In the founding, ideologies, and tactics of Greenpeace and
Earth First! can be found numerous examples of how self-identity
of the two groups’ members was important to the levels of
radicalism that they undertook.  The examples support the
possibility that Greenpeace members’ general self-identities were
ones of significance in the world order, but that Earth First!
members general self-identities were ones of insignificance.
Assuming that human thought and action is related to a sense of
self, which psychological studies support, the self-identities of
environmental activists helped to determine their ideologies and
the tactics that they employed for their movements.40  Greenpeace
members had self-identities of importance in the natural order, so
Greenpeace ideology gave humans an important role in nature.
Earth First! members had self-identities that viewed themselves as
rather unnecessary in the natural order, so Earth First! ideology
believed that humans were essentially unnecessary.  Therefore,
differences between the self-identities of Greenpeace members and
Earth First! members were manifested in the differences between
their ideologies and actions.  At the root of Greenpeace’s and Earth
First!’s levels of radicalism for the environmental movement was
the personal identities of their activists.
59
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 9 2004
Published by Scholar Commons, 2004
Radical Self 53
      36Dave Foreman, “Earth First!,” in Radical Environmentalism: Philosophy
and Tactics, ed. Peter List (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, Inc., 1993), 189.
      37Scarce, 54.
      38James Coates, “Earth First! Throws Monkey Wrench into Exploitation of
Wilds,” San Francisco Examiner 25 August 1985, sec. A.
      39Dave Foreman, “Strategic Monkeywrenching,” in Radical
Environmentalism: Philosophy and Tactics, ed. Peter List (Belmont, Cal.:
Wadsworth, Inc., 1993), 192-195.
a part of Earth First! direct actions as they bordered on making fun
of themselves.  Foreman’s emphasis on the importance of humor
to the movement suggests that Earth First!ers were always careful
never to take themselves too seriously.  In an article about Earth
First!’s goals, co-founder Foreman said, “Not only does humor
preserve individual and group sanity, it retards hubris, the major
cause of environmental rape, and it is also an effective weapon.”36
This tendency to take oneself lightly suggests an identity that did
not regard the self as very significant, and in fact, also views the
feeling of self-importance as dangerous.
The other major element of direct actions that separated Earth
First! from Greenpeace was its acceptance of ecotage as a legiti-
mate practice in environmental protection.  Earth First! did not
indiscriminately support all forms of ectoage, but the founding
members, especially Foreman, believed in it as a powerful tool
when used appropriately.  For Greenpeace, non-violence was part
of their overall strategy – each action was planned to be non-
violent, whereas for Earth First!, non-violence was a tactic – only
to be employed when it was more beneficial than violent
methods.37  Specific examples of Earth First! ecotage included
illegally pulling up survey stakes, pouring foreign substances into
the gas tanks of mobile machinery, and tree-spiking.38  Foreman,
because of his regard for ecotage (which he referred to as
“monkeywrenching”), wrote guidelines for its use, simultaneously
to endorse it as potentially effective and warn of the dangers if not
carefully implemented.  Foreman did not label ecotage as violence,
because it was only supposed to be directed at inanimate objects.39
54 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      40Karl Aquino and Americus Reed II, “The Self-Importance of Moral
Identity,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2002): 4-7.
Earth First!’s decision to use ecotage as a tactic illustrates that they
were prepared to engage themselves in the fight to oppose
environmental destruction to a greater degree than Greenpeace
members. In their acceptance of violence as a viable method, they
further placed the welfare of nature above their own.  Their
willingness to commit violence for the sake of wilderness in its
non-animal forms suggests once again that their lack of concern
for the human species reflected a personal identity as insignificant
in the natural world.
In the founding, ideologies, and tactics of Greenpeace and
Earth First! can be found numerous examples of how self-identity
of the two groups’ members was important to the levels of
radicalism that they undertook.  The examples support the
possibility that Greenpeace members’ general self-identities were
ones of significance in the world order, but that Earth First!
members general self-identities were ones of insignificance.
Assuming that human thought and action is related to a sense of
self, which psychological studies support, the self-identities of
environmental activists helped to determine their ideologies and
the tactics that they employed for their movements.40  Greenpeace
members had self-identities of importance in the natural order, so
Greenpeace ideology gave humans an important role in nature.
Earth First! members had self-identities that viewed themselves as
rather unnecessary in the natural order, so Earth First! ideology
believed that humans were essentially unnecessary.  Therefore,
differences between the self-identities of Greenpeace members and
Earth First! members were manifested in the differences between
their ideologies and actions.  At the root of Greenpeace’s and Earth
First!’s levels of radicalism for the environmental movement was
the personal identities of their activists.
60
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 9 [2004], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol9/iss1/1
The French Revolution and British Individualism 55
      1Albert Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic
Movement in the Age of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1979), 393.
Nothing to Do but to Obey Them:
The French Revolution and British Individualism
Tyler Pepple
Dr. Horsley, Bishop of Rochester, voiced the sentiments of many
conservatives in the British government when he gave a speech on
November 11, 1795 that proclaimed “the mass of the People in
every Country had nothing to do with the Laws but to obey them.”1
Such beliefs were common in Britain during the 1790’s and early
19th century among the Alarmist elite – a growing number of
aristocratic intellectuals within the government who believed the
rising popularity of radical movements speaking on behalf of the
people jeopardized the power of the nobles and, thus, all that was
good in Britain.  The masses had become far more overtly political
in the years before the French Revolution, furthering the conserva-
tive retreat.  For example, Prime Minister William Pitt, a one-time
reformer now became a rigid traditionalist, and Edmund Burke’s
Reflections on the Revolution in France quickly appeared after the
fall of the Bastille, defending what he saw as the inherent whole-
someness of the oligarchies in France and England.  The French
Revolution weighed heavily on the minds of the elite in Pitt’s
government, headlining an age devoid of rules and restrictions and
gave the primal habits of the masses free reign.  
While the French Revolution instilled in the British bourgeoi-
sie and proletariat a new sense of power that influenced the
English government is clear, but how the manifestation of the
power itself is ambiguous.  Studies of the masses in Britain after
the French Revolution are fairly young because historians tradi-
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tionally chose to focus on the aristocracy because of the amount of
information available and the opportunity for close examination of
individuals.  However, because the French Revolution was in
essence a revolt of the masses, studies on how it affected the
people of England have often shed more light on a turbulent and
complex period than have inherently limited studies of the
aristocracy.2
This essay attempts to follow in the interdisciplinary tradition
established in recent years by examining both the history and the
literature of the decades after the French Revolution in order to
discover how they both contributed to form the ‘spirit of the age.’
During the Romantic period, literature played a crucial role in both
shaping and mirroring the sentiments of the people by promoting
the ideology of the period.  It gave the political tensions of the day
a voice, and because of its potential for widespread dissemination,
was far more effective than the radical societies at providing
agency for the masses.
In Britain, I believe the empowerment of the masses arose
because the French Revolution gave them agency and contributed
to their growing sense of individuality – something that can best be
termed as “collective individuality,” which carries with it the
double meaning of a collection of individually minded people, and
a class expressing its own distinction from other classes and
carrying with it its own desires and demands.  Two factors acted
as catalysts for increasing this sense of collective individuality:
radical interest groups like the London Corresponding Society and
the Society for Constitutional Information, and the literature of the
period, especially political tracts and polemic and didactic
literature.  These forms were especially important in this period
because of the growing literacy rate among the masses.  Of the two
factors, the radical societies were certainly more threatening in
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their demand for lower-class rights as far as Pitt and the Alarmists
were concerned, but this would come at a cost for the societies
were easy targets for the government.  Political tracts and didactic
novels, however, were more difficult to suppress given their
widespread distribution.
Certainly the greatest instigator of the surge in polemical
essays in the 1790’s was Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the
Revolution in France.  Inspired by his disgust with the Unitarian
minister Richard Price’s sermon, A Discourse on the Love of Our
Country, Burke’s essay argued vehemently for the status quo.
Burke reacted against Price’s exhortations that he had “lived to see
THIRTY MILLIONS of people, indignant and resolute, spurning at
slavery, and demanding liberty with an irresistible voice; their king
led in triumph, and an arbitrary monarch surrendering himself to
his subjects.”3  For Burke, the lowly mob leading their king “in
triumph” was the pinnacle of evil that could be perpetrated on an
established government.  The king and the nobility were necessary
to the governing of a country because they were the vessels of the
political brain, a fact proven historically, Burke thought: “How
very soon France, when she had a moment to respire, recovered
and emerged from the longest and most dreadful civil war that ever
was known in any nation.  Why?  Because, among all their
massacres, they had not slain the mind in their country.”4  The
people in the “swinish multitude” were not fit to govern because
they had common minds, a quality that would greatly circumscribe
a king’s authority.  
Burke’s answer for the problems in France (which he admitted
there were) was reform based on the old ways in England – to
devise a system of government like the one in place in Britain.
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The French government, in other words, was “very nearly as good
as could be wished” until all this democracy nonsense stepped onto
the world stage again.5  According to Burke the Revolution was
and would continue to be a failure because France destroyed a
system that was designed for its benefit.  
Not everyone agreed with Burke’s sentiments, especially
Thomas Paine.  Paine’s Rights of Man is less important for what it
says than for how it says it.  Much of its content focuses on
attacking Burke’s flowery language, or “learned jargon,” and
making him out to be a kind of contemporary sophist whose
sentences end “with music in the ear, and nothing in the heart.”6
Paine capitalizes on Burke’s pretensions by dissecting his complex
phrases in order to make them look ridiculous.  This tactic was
influential captivating a growing reading public lacking the critical
capacity to understand much of the Reflections.  Indeed, the
1790’s, according to McCann, saw an explosion of writers
interested in the public sphere “and its related term the ‘market’ as
general and abstract entities.”7  This explosion is partially attrib-
uted to a growing cultural insistence on the belief that literature
possessed a socially redemptive value.   Novelists and political
essayists like Paine exploited this by simplifying their language to
make it accessible to more readers, resulting in a democratization
of both literature and ideas that crossed class borders and, in a
sense, unified the political and literary spheres.  The elite were not
the sole participants in politics any longer, for writers now made
the pressing issues of the day accessible to everyone’s understand-
ing.
There were two consequences to such a change.  First,
individuals in the lower-classes of society were flattered by these
writers who insisted they were as fit to govern the country as those
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already in power, which increased the collective ego of the mob,
in turn increasing its disposition to insurrectionary violence.
Second, Burke and the Alarmists were far too clever not to spot
this trend, and exaggerated it for their own benefit, arguing that
tracts like Paine’s were inherently revolutionary due to their effect
on the public.  
The debate symbolized by Burke and Paine led to a far greater
political awareness among the masses.  Paine’s insistence that
government was formed for the people was a strong counterargu-
ment against Burke’s conservative appeals to maintain the status
quo, and did much to instill a sense of individualism among the
people.  “The fact therefore must be,” Paine wrote,
that the individuals themselves, each in his own personal
and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each
other to produce a government: and this is the only mode
in which governments have a right to arise, and the only
principle on which they have a right to exist.8
It was the masses that were in control of the government, not as a
swinish multitude but a collection of individuals who were capable
of voicing their own demands.  Each person was not merely
capable of voicing his or her demands, but was also potentially as
effective as the elites in government: “Every history of the
creation…all agree in establishing one point, the unity of man; by
which I mean, that men are all of one degree, and consequently
that all men are born equal and with equal natural right.”9  Paine’s
critique of the government, then, was twofold.  He argued that in
its present state it reduced people to an existence below a true
human life, although these men and women were theoretically
capable of accomplishing anything those in power could achieve.
The challenge the Rights of Man posed to Pitt’s government
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demanded a reaction.  Much of the Alarmist case against Paine was
his intentionally simplistic language.  Arguing that it was intended
as an insurrectionary appeal to a growing reading public who were
not sophisticated enough to understand essays like the Reflections,
the conservatives in the government labeled it as intentionally
subversive.  Through such reasoning, were able to push for more
repressive measures to keep the public from voicing its discontent.
It also helped the Alarmist claim that the French Revolution was
not a secluded movement.  In 1793, when the Reign of Terror
began and France declared war on Britain, Pitt was able to use
these events to label the English radical societies as “Jacobin” and
“revolutionary”, which now isolated them and singled them out,
albeit unfairly, as potentially traitorous organizations which would
have to toe the line carefully if they wished to remain a public
presence.
In reality, the radical societies were hardly revolutionary.
Rather, they saw Parliamentary reform as their main objective,
concentrating specifically on universal suffrage and annual
elections to Parliament.  Their effectiveness at petitioning Parlia-
ment was never great, but they gained strength after the Revolution
and the publication of the Rights of Man, which acted as a common
bond for all the radical societies.
Ironically, the rise of the radical societies in the 1790s was
largely due to Burke’s publication of the Reflections on the
Revolution in France because it prompted Paine’s reply.  Burke
even singled out the London Revolution Society and the Society
for Constitutional Information, the two most famous radical
societies at the time.  He disparages the group by illustrating that
they were virtually nonexistent until the Revolution occurred,
discrediting them in a society that placed so much importance on
being heard and recognized:10
65
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 9 2004
Published by Scholar Commons, 2004
The French Revolution and British Individualism 59
      8Paine, 41.
      9Ibid., 36.
already in power, which increased the collective ego of the mob,
in turn increasing its disposition to insurrectionary violence.
Second, Burke and the Alarmists were far too clever not to spot
this trend, and exaggerated it for their own benefit, arguing that
tracts like Paine’s were inherently revolutionary due to their effect
on the public.  
The debate symbolized by Burke and Paine led to a far greater
political awareness among the masses.  Paine’s insistence that
government was formed for the people was a strong counterargu-
ment against Burke’s conservative appeals to maintain the status
quo, and did much to instill a sense of individualism among the
people.  “The fact therefore must be,” Paine wrote,
that the individuals themselves, each in his own personal
and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each
other to produce a government: and this is the only mode
in which governments have a right to arise, and the only
principle on which they have a right to exist.8
It was the masses that were in control of the government, not as a
swinish multitude but a collection of individuals who were capable
of voicing their own demands.  Each person was not merely
capable of voicing his or her demands, but was also potentially as
effective as the elites in government: “Every history of the
creation…all agree in establishing one point, the unity of man; by
which I mean, that men are all of one degree, and consequently
that all men are born equal and with equal natural right.”9  Paine’s
critique of the government, then, was twofold.  He argued that in
its present state it reduced people to an existence below a true
human life, although these men and women were theoretically
capable of accomplishing anything those in power could achieve.
The challenge the Rights of Man posed to Pitt’s government
60 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      10Keith Hanley and Raman Selden, eds., Revolution and English
Romanticism: Politics and Rhetoric, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990),
Michael Ferber, “The Liberty of Appearing: Two Versions of the Romantic
demanded a reaction.  Much of the Alarmist case against Paine was
his intentionally simplistic language.  Arguing that it was intended
as an insurrectionary appeal to a growing reading public who were
not sophisticated enough to understand essays like the Reflections,
the conservatives in the government labeled it as intentionally
subversive.  Through such reasoning, were able to push for more
repressive measures to keep the public from voicing its discontent.
It also helped the Alarmist claim that the French Revolution was
not a secluded movement.  In 1793, when the Reign of Terror
began and France declared war on Britain, Pitt was able to use
these events to label the English radical societies as “Jacobin” and
“revolutionary”, which now isolated them and singled them out,
albeit unfairly, as potentially traitorous organizations which would
have to toe the line carefully if they wished to remain a public
presence.
In reality, the radical societies were hardly revolutionary.
Rather, they saw Parliamentary reform as their main objective,
concentrating specifically on universal suffrage and annual
elections to Parliament.  Their effectiveness at petitioning Parlia-
ment was never great, but they gained strength after the Revolution
and the publication of the Rights of Man, which acted as a common
bond for all the radical societies.
Ironically, the rise of the radical societies in the 1790s was
largely due to Burke’s publication of the Reflections on the
Revolution in France because it prompted Paine’s reply.  Burke
even singled out the London Revolution Society and the Society
for Constitutional Information, the two most famous radical
societies at the time.  He disparages the group by illustrating that
they were virtually nonexistent until the Revolution occurred,
discrediting them in a society that placed so much importance on
being heard and recognized:10
66
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 9 [2004], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol9/iss1/1
The French Revolution and British Individualism 61
Enlightenment,” 91-92.
      11Burke, 87.
      12Ibid., 206.
The National Assembly has given importance to these
gentlemen by adopting them; and they return the favour,
by acting as a committee in England for extending the
principles of the National Assembly.  Henceforward we
must consider them as a kind of privileged persons; as no
inconsiderable members of the diplomatic body.  This is
one among the revolutions which have given splendor to
obscurity, and distinction to undiscerned merit.  Until very
lately I do not recollect to have heard of this club [London
Revolution Society].  I am quite sure that it never occu-
pied a moment of my thoughts; nor, I believe, those of any
person out of their own set.11
For Burke, the French Revolution brought the radical societies to
the attention of those in government.  This was problematic, for
while the passage ironically treats the societies by speaking of
them as significant in their own eyes but in no one else’s, it also
admits to the importance of being recognized at all.
Burke and the Alarmists had other reasons to fear the radical
societies besides their newfound fame.  They believed that the
ultimate goal of the radical groups was the abolition of the
aristocracy.  Even if reform were the objective as the radical
societies claimed, this was seen as a stepping stone to all out
revolution.  Pitt voiced this concern when noting the connection of
certain MPs to the societies.  He argued that they “were concerned
with others, who preferred not reform only, but direct hostility to
the very form of our government.  This afforded suspicion, that the
motion for a reform was nothing more than the preliminary to the
overthrow of the whole system of our present government.”12
The watch was tight, and the radical societies were forced to
cautiously play by the rules of the British constitution.  For
62 Historical Perspectives March 2004
instance, most members of the societies supported petitioning
Parliament for governmental reforms rather than calling a National
Convention, a revolutionary buzzword given its connection to
French republicanism and the September Massacres.  Although
petitioning the government to reform itself was their most overt
action in the eyes of the Alarmists, the dissemination of Painite
propaganda proved far more beneficial to their cause.
The Society for Constitutional Information, which was in
decline after the outbreak of the French Revolution due to repeated
failures in pushing the government toward universal suffrage., was
saved by Paine.  After he published the Rights of Man, the Society
for Constitutional Information lost no time in advertising its
connection to the author and the result was mutually beneficial,
swelling membership for the society and increasing sales for Paine.
This, of course, is not meant to suggest that Paine’s popularity was
entirely based on the radical societies’ propaganda machine, for,
as already stated, the Rights of Man held plenty of appeal for the
masses by itself.  
Paine, however, was not the only author giving agency to the
lower classes.  Novelists and poets were also speaking out, and
among them was William Wordsworth, who based his poetry more
on common life than previous writers had.  Woodsworth was a
radical in the early years of the French Revolution but quickly
turned conservative.  His reaction to events in both Britain and
France is interesting because of its ambivalence.  The tremendous
potential power of the masses occupied his thoughts often because
of the possibility of its acting for good or evil.  His overall
philosophy was similar to that of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who
argued in 1802 that the “grand ideal of Freedom” cannot be
realized “under any form of human government.”  Rather, it
belongs to “the individual man, so far as he is pure, and inflamed
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with the love and adoration of God in Nature.”13  Both Coleridge
and Wordsworth also feared the mob because of its potential for
recklessness.  They had respect due to the number of individuals
it contained, and the French Revolution was therefore first seen as
a triumph.  In the Prelude, Wordsworth recalls his initial feelings
toward the Revolution:
To aspirations then of our own minds
Did we appeal; and, finally, beheld
A living confirmation of the whole
Before us in a People risen up
Fresh as the morning star.  Elate we looked
Upon their virtues, saw in rudest men
Self-sacrifice the firmest, generous love
And continence of mind, and sense of right
Uppermost in the midst of fiercest strife.14
Written in 1805, these words reflected the way Wordsworth felt in
1789, but the sentiments were not endemic to the initial stages of
the French Revolution.  During his early radical years, the French
Revolution presented a new and promising age for Wordsworth,
where “human nature seeming born again” could flourish in a
democratic utopia.15  The mob was hardly an ignoble mass and was
every bit as good as the hegemonic oligarchy of either Britain or
France because it represented a group of individuals capable of
ruling themselves.
Wordsworth’s poetry is famous for individualizing members
of the masses, both by examining individuals and by bringing the
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lifestyle of the lower classes into the lofty realm of poetry.  “The
majority of the following poems are to be considered as experi-
ments,” Wordsworth wrote in his Advertisement to the Lyrical
Ballads.  “They were written chiefly with a view to ascertain how
far the language of conversation in the middle and lower classes of
society is adapted to the purposes of poetic pleasure.”16  It must be
stressed here that the Lyrical Ballads was not published until 1798,
nine years after the fall of the Bastille and also well after the Reign
of Terror, which helped shift Wordsworth’s political beliefs to the
right.  The result was, as already stated, an ambivalent attitude
over the mob’s right to independence.  As Michael Ferber puts it,
Wordsworth “wanted everyone in the world, from the hunger-
bitten French girl with the heifer to the distraught mother who
drowned her baby, to come into view, to be seen by the public, but
he could not quite face the possibility that they might comprise the
public themselves.”17  Nevertheless, Wordsworth’s respect for the
power of the masses and the potential of each individual would
remain with him through his entire life, and the Lyrical Ballads are
the perfect place to look for the pervasive influence lower class life
would have on his art.  As he states in that famous passage from
the Preface, “Low and rustic life was generally chosen, because in
that condition, the essential passions of the heart find a better soil
in which they can attain their maturity, are less under restraint, and
speak a plainer and more emphatic language.”18  The importance
here is that we get a look into individual lives in the lower class.
To Wordsworth and his readers, these were real people with real
problems and concerns, not just a herd that had “nothing to do with
the laws but to obey them.”
These were also the beliefs of the radical societies, though
their politics differed greatly from Wordsworth’s.  It seems clear
that the idea of a collective individualism was hardly endemic to
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here is that we get a look into individual lives in the lower class.
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one specific political ideology, instead occupied a pervasive realm
of British life that concerned every class, whether the people
perceived it or not.  The British radical societies understood the
problem, however, and dedicated their time to bringing it to the
attention of others and to press for Parliamentary reform.  The
consequences of such actions were costly, for it brought them to
the attention of Pitt and the Alarmists.  The London Corresponding
Society’s address to the National Assembly was not to be taken
lightly by those in the government:
We can with confidence assure you Freemen and Friends,
that knowledge makes a rapid progress among us; that
curiosity has taken possession of the minds of the public;
that the reign of Ignorance, inseparable from that of
Despotism, is vanishing; and that at present, all men ask
each other, What is Liberty?  What are our Rights?
Frenchmen you are already free, but Britons are preparing
to be so.19
The London Revolution Society’s address was not less
controversial: “Royal prerogatives, injurious to the public interest,
a servile Peerage, a rapacious and intolerant clergy, and corrupt
Representation are grievances under which we suffer.  But as you,
perhaps, have profited from the example of our Ancestors, so shall
we from your late glorious and splendid actions.”20  The last
sentence in this passage is particularly ominous.  If the French
gained their freedom through revolution, how would the British
expect to gain the same liberties?
The fears of the British government were compounded when
the London Corresponding Society and the Society for Constitu-
tional Information came together in 1793 to form the British
Convention after failing to petition for parliamentary reform
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through the Whig opposition on May 7, 1793.  Its reference to the
governing body in France and its use of French Revolutionary
language was overt.  Delegates at the Convention, for example,
addressed each other as “Citizens,” November 29, 1793, was
labeled “the First Year of the British Convention,” reports were
often headed with the phrase, “Vive la Convention,” and it was
suggested that the Convention’s “Address to the British People” be
preceded by a Declaration of Rights.”21
What the radical societies were thinking by utilizing so much
rhetoric from the French Revolution, especially considering their
insistence on their reformist nature, is unclear.  What is clear,
moreover, is the manner of  the government response.  Pitt
announced a bill to suspend habeus corpus, which passed on May
18, 1794.  While the bill was only applicable to those thought to be
engaged in treasonable practices, such a definition was broad
enough to hold any leaders of the radical societies without trial.  
In early June, the three members of the radical societies with
the highest profiles, Thomas Hardy, Horne Took, and John
Thelwall, were imprisoned.  This time, however, the result was not
what the government had anticipated.  All three were acquitted by
December, and the other members of the radical societies were
subsequently released.  The trials were not without their successes
for the government, though.  The greatest casualty for the radical
societies was the Society for Constitutional Information, which
ceased to meet after its secretary, Daniel Adams, turned King’s
evidence and supplied the government with all of the group’s
records.  Additionally, financial problems gripped the London
Corresponding Society, which used much of its funds in defending
Hardy and Thelwall.  While it continued to operate, membership
dwindled significantly.22
Circumstances changed temporarily in October of 1795 when
the opening of the new Parliamentary session was disrupted by an
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attack on the King’s carriage.  Pitt used the incident to introduce
the Two Acts – the Treasonable Practices Bill and the Seditious
Meetings Bill.  The former altered the current law in order to
widen the scope of treason and include “any who ‘compassed or
devised’ the death, bodily harm, imprisonment or deposition of the
King, who exerted pressure on him to change his measures or
counsels, who plotted to assist foreign invaders, or to intimidate or
overawe both houses or either house of Parliament, whether such
intention was expressed…by overt act, or by speech or writing.”23
The latter bill was designed to regulate the content and number of
public meetings by forcing those organizing the meeting to submit
a written document specifying the time, place, and purpose of each
meeting to a local newspaper and the local magistrate, who could
approve or deny the meeting.  Both of these bills were repressive
measures designed to silence the voices for Parliamentary reform
and for lower-class rights.  Once again, however, the results of the
Two Acts were ambivalent.  Fierce resistance from all sides rose
up against the bills.  Charles Fox labeled the time as “Pitt’s Reign
of Terror,” and there were ninety-four petitions with a total of
130,000 signatures in opposition presented to Parliament.24  During
this time, the membership of the London Corresponding Society
swelled again.  But the revival was short-lived as  December 7,
1795, was the last protest meeting the London Corresponding
Society held and repeated exhortations by Thelwall to remain
defiant were useless.  In the end, the most obstinate radicals were
forced to seek refuge abroad.  The Whig opposition, led by Fox,
had no other alternative, but to secede from the House of Com-
mons in 1797.
Of these radicals living abroad, none was more famous than
Percy Shelley.  Of all the Romantic authors, he and Wordsworth
best encapsulate the growing sentiments of individualism that had
taken root among the masses.  Shelley was far more of a political
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poet than Wordworth, making him a kind of culminating artist of
the period – a result of both the political and artistic tensions that
had been festering for over three decades.  In A Defense of Poetry,
he elucidates why he views poetry as supremely (and sublimely)
important.  Part of the reason is its connection with politics,
exclaiming that, “Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the
World.”25  And he means this in a distinctly political sense.  “We
live among such philosophers and poets as surpass beyond
comparison any who have appeared since the last national struggle
for civil and religious liberty.  The most unfailing herald, compan-
ion, and follower of the awakening of a great people to work a
beneficial change in opinion or institution, is Poetry.”26  Poets, in
other words, have the ability to influence men’s actions through
their art; to become “as generals to the bewildered armies of
[men’s] thoughts.”27  This influence comes primarily from the
heightened self-esteem men feel when reading poetry, which, like
Paine’s more universal language, ennobles the masses and offers
them a new perspective on life.28
Perhaps Shelley’s most ambitious attempt at putting such a
philosophy into action is Prometheus Unbound.  This four-act play
personifies the masses in the character of Prometheus, thus giving
them both a face and a hero.  Chained to the Caucusus Mountains
in India by the tyrant god Jupiter, Prometheus eventually frees
humanity with the help of Demogorgon, the ruler of the under-
world.  Prometheus Unbound is filled with assertions of the
potential power of the people.  “I gave all / He has,” Prometheus
says of Jupiter, “and in return he chains me here / Years, ages,
night and day.”29  Just as the people were first responsible for
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giving the king his power, so Prometheus is the fountainhead of
Jupiter’s power, and the result is a despotic government where all
that is good is turned to evil purposes:
The good want power, but to weep barren tears.
The powerful goodness want: worse need for them.
The wise want love, and those who love want wisdom;
And all the best things are thus confused to ill.
Many are strong and rich, -- and would be just, -- 
But live among their suffering fellow men
As if none felt – they know not what they do.30
Yet, among this chaos is the pervading sense that all will one day
be right because all people, while controlled by society, are still in
control of their own passions and beliefs.  “Yet I am king over
myself, and rule / The torturing and conflicting throngs within / As
Jove rules you when Hell grows mutinous,” Prometheus exclaims
to the Furies.31  Hope is always present in Prometheus Unbound
because oppressed individuals are capable of something more than
they are allowed to be under the tyranny of Jupiter’s rule.  
What emerges in this study of the literature and politics of the
decades after the French Revolution is the discrepancy between
what occurred in the two realms.  Both the radical societies and the
writers of the time were influenced by the collective individuality
emerging in the masses ( including conservative writers like
Burke, who were influenced negatively).  The radical societies,
however, were far less successful than the writers in achieving
their goals.  As distinct organizations that could be equated to
revolutionary France (which was also an enemy of Britain for the
most of the period studied here), they offered easy targets for the
repressive measures of Pitt’s government.  Authors such as Paine
were more difficult to silence because of the rate of dissemination
70 Historical Perspectives March 2004
of their texts, while others, like Wordsworth, could bring the lives
of “low and rustic” people to the foreground without being overtly
political.
The literary and the political realms were thus tied together in
complex ways, as each supported a similar ideology, and when it
was challenged by Pitt’s oligarchy, the two areas necessarily grew
closer together.  It is partially because of the relationship between
politics and literature that the Romantic period was such a dynamic
one.  Long after the demise of the radical societies, the government
could still boast that at least the mass of people in England “had
nothing to do with the laws but to obey them,” but authors such as
Wordsworth and Shelley, who were active well into the 19th
century, proved that the influence of the French Revolution on the
collective individuality of the masses was far from ephemeral.
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Secrets, Schemes, and Strategies:
Nixon Opens Relations with Communist China
Kelsey Swanson
In the Cold War era, the United States faced challenges from two
Communist giants: the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC).  The United States considered both nations to be a
threat to international stability, but had failed to significantly
improve relations with these countries in the 1950s and 1960s.
While the United States was already engaging in talks with the
Soviet Union at this time, it had failed to even recognize the
existence of the PRC for over twenty years.  President Nixon and
his advisor Henry A. Kissinger devised a grand plan to normalize
relations with the PRC while continuing to better relations with the
Soviet Union.  Although such a strategy succeeded to some degree
in the immediate aftermath of the event, in the long run, the Soviet
Union had more pressing reasons for improving relations with the
United States.  What initiated this change in policy?  Because the
Chinese and Soviets were hostile toward one another, Nixon and
Kissinger sought rapprochement with the PRC mainly to gain more
leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union.
In October 1949, the Chinese Communists, led by Mao Tse-
tung, proclaimed victory for the new People’s Republic of China
over the United States-supported Nationalists.1  The Nationalists’
leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to Formosa (Taiwan), establishing
the Republic of China on this island.  While the Republicans
blamed Truman and the Democrats for having “lost” China to the
Communists, in fact, there really was not much that the United
72 Historical Perspectives March 2004
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States could have done to prevent this end result.  The Chinese
people simply saw their interests better served with Mao.  After
1949, the U.S. was hesitant in formally recognizing the PRC
because of the support for Chiang by many in government office
and because of a sense of mistrust toward Mao and the Commu-
nists.2  During the Korean War that began in 1950, relations
between the United States and the PRC deteriorated as the
Communists intervened to help the North Koreans, pushing back
American and United Nations forces to the Thirty-eighth Parallel.
This confrontation with the PRC garnered more support for the
Nationalists on Formosa, as the United States saw the anti-
American Mao as the enemy.  
The Republican Party regained the Presidency in 1952 with
World War II hero Dwight David Eisenhower as their nominee.
Once elected, he promised not to recognize “Red China” under
current conditions, hoping to isolate the PRC.  Later American
involvement in the Vietnam War to contain the spread of Commu-
nism harmed relations between the two countries further.  The fact
that Vice President Richard Nixon, as early as 1954, believed that
the PRC was backing the Vietnamese Communists by providing
them military supplies, made the possibility of rapprochement even
more distant.3
In his October 1967 Foreign Affairs article entitled “Asia After
Vietnam,” Nixon hinted at the need for the United States to better
relations with China in the future, but only after it changed its
aggressive policies.  In the conclusion of the article, Nixon
explained his view on U.S. policy toward China: “For the long run,
it means pulling China back into the world community—but as a
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great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolu-
tion.”4
How could Nixon advocate such a policy toward the Commu-
nists?  First, Nixon had a history of being firmly anti-communist.
Not only was he a charter member of the “Who Lost China Club?”,
but he was also a steadfast realist who recognized the importance
of balance of power and geopolitical stability.5   This position
allowed him to work towards future relations with China without
seeming “soft” on Communism when he was elected President in
1968.  Nixon also was a Republican and therefore able to exploit
the idea that the Democrats “lost” China.  If a Democratic presi-
dent had shown signs of wanting to improve relations between the
two countries, he would be seen as trying to appease the Commu-
nists.  Nixon, on the other hand, would just be trying to work with
the situation that the Democrats left him.  Thus, President Nixon
had the right political position to make rapprochement with the
PRC even possible. 
A complimentary asset to Nixon in his hope for better relations
with China was Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs and later Secretary of State.  Kissinger
was a true believer in peace through stability and longed for order
in the world.6  In the Cold War era, Kissinger had two main
strategies to achieve his goal of stability: détente and linkage
diplomacy, which worked hand-in-hand.  As defined by Kissinger,
détente was “the search for a more constructive relationship with
the Soviet Union.”7  It was more broadly used to describe the
relaxation of tensions between hostile countries, including
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Communist China.  Kissinger saw détente as something imperative
in the age of nuclear power, when each side could potentially
destroy the other.8  Détente, however, was not about coming to
agreement on ideological values.  Instead, the goal was to come to
peace without compromising the vital interests of either nation
involved.  
In order to achieve détente between two nations, Kissinger
believed that linkage between issues was necessary.  This strategy,
known as linkage diplomacy, involved moving talks along with the
Soviet Union on arms control while settling political differences at
the same time.  Thus, the strategy was essentially the idea that
progress in one area was dependent on progress in other areas.   At
one of Nixon’s first presidential press conferences as President, he
enunciated the concept of linkage as having “strategic arms talks”
in such a way as to promote “progress on outstanding political
problems at the same time,” especially on “problems in which the
United States and the Soviet Union can serve the cause of peace.”9
Kissinger’s linkage approach dealt with issues in the global
sense, not just as isolated events.  Issues could not just be compart-
mentalized, for Kissinger believed that the Soviet Union would
then use cooperation in one area while simultaneously trying to get
the upper hand elsewhere.10  This policy would create both
incentives and negative consequences for Soviet action, so that in
the end, the Soviet Union would be led to détente with the United
States.11  The ultimate end of the linkage strategy was to make both
United States and Soviet policy in line with the realities of the
world situation.  Most Americans, however, saw linkage diplo-
macy as just the Administration’s way of stalling arms limitations
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incentives and negative consequences for Soviet action, so that in
the end, the Soviet Union would be led to détente with the United
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world situation.  Most Americans, however, saw linkage diplo-
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talks with the Soviet Union.12  Nevertheless, when Nixon and
Kissinger saw the rise of China as threatening global stability, the
policies of détente and linkage were used to normalize relations. 
On July 23, 1969, President Nixon articulated what came to be
known as the Nixon Doctrine.  This statement limited the extent of
U.S. involvement in Asia in order to ensure that there would be no
future situations like Vietnam.13  The United States would respect
its existing treaty obligations, but it would not make any more
commitments in the area unless essential to American interests.  In
addition, the United States would issue arms and money to help
Asian nations fight aggression, but it would be the responsibility
of the country to provide the manpower necessary to fight.  There
was one main exception to the aforementioned conditions: if an
ally was threatened by a nuclear power, referring to the Soviet
Union or the PRC, the United States would be compelled to act
directly.14  Thus, although the United States saw the trouble in
further involvement in Asia after the Vietnam War, it was not
ready to totally remove itself from Asia, where the two largest
Communist states were located.  
Was there a higher purpose than solely to limit United States
involvement in Asia at work in the Nixon Doctrine?  International
relations expert Robert Litwak argus that one of the keys to the
Nixon Doctrine was in détente with both China and the Soviet
Union.  If the United States could normalize relations with these
two countries, then the Asian continent would be more stable in
terms of United States interests, and the U.S. could start to transfer
its power to its ally nations in the area.15  As long as the United
States and China were enemies, it was not likely that the United
States would surrender significant interest in Asia even if the
Nixon Doctrine outlined such a position.  Therefore, one reason for
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the beginning of Sino-American rapprochement under Nixon was
that it flowed logically from the Nixon Doctrine and provided
stability in Southeast Asia.  
Nixon and Kissinger had other motivations in seeking to
normalize relations between the United States and the PRC after
over twenty years of non-recognition and hostility. Nixon clearly
stated the obvious reason that better relations were “certainly in
our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and
the world.”16  Just as détente with the Communist Soviet Union
was beneficial to maintaining peace during the Cold War, détente
with the PRC would provide similar results, especially after U.S.-
Sino conflicts in Korea and Vietnam.  Therefore, rapprochement
simply for the sake of better relations was an important consider-
ation.  The sheer size of mainland China was another factor.  The
existence of a 3.7 million square mile expanse of land with
approximately 750 million people could not be ignored or isolated
politically and economically.17  President Nixon, speaking in
Kansas City explained, “Mainland China, outside the world
community, completely isolated, with its leaders not in communi-
cation with world leaders, would be a danger to the whole world
that would be unacceptable.”18  Although these were important
considerations, the possibility of improving relations with the
Soviet Union was the most significant cause for a United States
interest in normalization with the PRC.  
There were ideological disagreements between the Soviets and
the Chinese during this time, even though both nations were
Communist.  Mao Tse-tung believed Chinese Communism to be
purer than that of the Soviets, since China had achieved Commu-
nism without going through a stage of socialism.19  Another
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States would surrender significant interest in Asia even if the
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the beginning of Sino-American rapprochement under Nixon was
that it flowed logically from the Nixon Doctrine and provided
stability in Southeast Asia.  
Nixon and Kissinger had other motivations in seeking to
normalize relations between the United States and the PRC after
over twenty years of non-recognition and hostility. Nixon clearly
stated the obvious reason that better relations were “certainly in
our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and
the world.”16  Just as détente with the Communist Soviet Union
was beneficial to maintaining peace during the Cold War, détente
with the PRC would provide similar results, especially after U.S.-
Sino conflicts in Korea and Vietnam.  Therefore, rapprochement
simply for the sake of better relations was an important consider-
ation.  The sheer size of mainland China was another factor.  The
existence of a 3.7 million square mile expanse of land with
approximately 750 million people could not be ignored or isolated
politically and economically.17  President Nixon, speaking in
Kansas City explained, “Mainland China, outside the world
community, completely isolated, with its leaders not in communi-
cation with world leaders, would be a danger to the whole world
that would be unacceptable.”18  Although these were important
considerations, the possibility of improving relations with the
Soviet Union was the most significant cause for a United States
interest in normalization with the PRC.  
There were ideological disagreements between the Soviets and
the Chinese during this time, even though both nations were
Communist.  Mao Tse-tung believed Chinese Communism to be
purer than that of the Soviets, since China had achieved Commu-
nism without going through a stage of socialism.19  Another
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ideological contention was the Chinese accusation that the Soviet
leaders were “revisionists,” and thus the real head of the Commu-
nist revolution was Mao Tse-tung, located in the Chinese capital
of Peking.20  Mao thought the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was
too intent on peaceful relations with the West, giving up the
revolutionary aspect of Communism.  Before, the United States
believed in the monolithic character of international Commu-
nism—that Communism was under control of the Soviets and
everything stemmed from their wishes.  However, with the
nationalism of the Chinese Communists and open hostility with the
Soviets, this theory failed.  Kissinger believed that this history of
hostility that had existed before and after the 1950s between China
and the Soviet Union would continue to exist, and thus the United
States’ policies had to adjust to this new world power structure.
Kissinger’s idea to stabilize the world order in this era of the
Sino-Soviet split involved what political scientists call “triangular
diplomacy,” a branch of linkage diplomacy. Triangular diplomacy
was the concept that the interests of the United States were best
served if it preserved better relations with both the Chinese and
Soviets than these two countries did with each other.21  The policy
“linked” progress with China to further progress with the Soviet
Union.  The United States was to hold the most favorable position
in the triangle and act like a fulcrum, with the two other countries
depending on the U.S.  In this way, both China and the Soviet
Union would try to gain favor with the United States against the
other country.  The United States would then act as the balancer
between the two countries, establishing better relations with each
country as well as a global equilibrium in the process.22  However,
the key was not to antagonize one of the countries too much, for it
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was like “walking a delicate tightrope.”23  If the United States
could achieve rapprochement with the PRC, the idea was that it
would gain huge leverage over the Soviet Union, which would lead
to greater Soviet cooperation.  Plus, the Chinese had reasons to
want to seek normalization of relations with the United States.  The
PRC was experiencing definite hostility with the Soviet Union, a
nation with superior military force.  Would the Chinese really want
to be isolated from both the United States and the Soviet Union?
Since Kissinger believed that the Chinese feared the Soviet Union
more than the United States, reconciliation between the two Pacific
powers seemed possible.24  Thus, triangular diplomacy was based
on using continuing hostilities between the two Communist
superpowers to achieve global stability. 
Once the Nixon-Kissinger strategy was established to seek
rapprochement with the PRC, a series of subtle diplomatic
exchanges traveled between Washington and Peking aimed at
showing each country’s good intentions about establishing
relations.  The United States first tired to resume Sino-American
talks after a two-year break.  This was achieved with talks
beginning on January 20, 1970 in Warsaw between the U.S.
Ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, and Lei Yang from the
PRC, eventually resulting in the Chinese accepting the U.S.
proposal to send a high-ranking American official to Peking to
serve as leader of the American delegation in discussions there.25
In Nixon’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress in February 1970,
the President reported, “The Chinese are a great and vital people
who should not remain isolated from the international commu-
nity…But it is certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace
and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can
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toward improved practical relations with Peking.”26  Although the
talks between the PRC and the United States were temporarily
halted due to the American invasion of Cambodia, diplomatic
channels reopened after a couple of months.  
Nixon opened up indirect channels to China through President
Yahya Khan of Pakistan and President Nicolae Ceausescu of
Romania in order to keep the State Department out of the negotia-
tions.27  The Department of State had a large bureaucracy and was
not very secretive, which was important to Nixon and China in the
beginning of this new relationship.  In another positive gesture
towards China, on October 26, 1970, Nixon actually called China
the “People’s Republic of China” instead of “Communist China.”28
After a series of messages between the White House and Chou En-
lai discussing the sending of an American envoy to Peking and
identifying the main obstacle to diplomatic relations as Taiwan, a
breakthrough occurred.  On April 27, 1971, a message was
received through the Pakistan channel from Chou En-lai that
stated, “The Chinese government reaffirms its willingness to
receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the
U.S. (for instance Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or
even the President of the U.S. himself for a direct meeting and
discussion.”29  The scene was now set for the United States and the
PRC to openly discuss, in person, the differences hindering
improved relations. 
 During the same month, the Chinese sent another signal
proving their desire for better relations.  Both the Chinese and the
United States table tennis team were participating in the World
Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan.  Nineteen-year-old
Glenn Cowan from Santa Monica, California, approached the
Chinese team captain to get a ride on a bus with them to see the
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pearl farms.  In retrospect, Kissinger noted that such an event
never would have happened unless Mao and Chou En-lai explicitly
told the team to be nice to the Americans.30  Cowan later gave the
Chinese captain a T-shirt and he received a Chinese scarf in return.
However, what became known as ping-pong diplomacy was more
than just an exchange of gifts.  The Chinese actually invited the
American team to visit on April 6, and when they arrived at the
reception that Chou En-lai arranged, he proclaimed, “You have
opened a new chapter in the relations of the American and Chinese
people.”31  An invitation was extended to the Chinese team to visit
the United States as well.  Chou En-lai’s overture to the ping-pong
team was symbolic of the readiness of the Communist Chinese
government to develop relations with the United States. 
After it was certain that an American official was welcome in
Peking, the question became who to send.  After brainstorming for
possible candidates, Nixon decided on Kissinger, for he knew
Nixon’s policy best and the President could exert the most control
over him.32  As part of his plan, Nixon wanted his representative to
go on a secret trip to China beforehand to formally arrange the
details of the President’s trip.  If the trip were secret, Nixon did not
have to worry about other countries, such as the Republic of China,
attempting to thwart the trip, wanting a list of concessions, or
making the U.S. promise not to compromise.33  In addition, the
United States was simply not familiar with China or its officials,
and, not knowing what to expect, wanted to keep this first trip
secret.  Kissinger was the perfect person for a secret trip.  Not only
was he furtive by nature, but he also had a reputation of being a
playboy, dating many different women, including the actresses Jill
St. John, Shirley MacLaine, Marlo Thomas, Candice Bergen, and
85
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 9 2004
Published by Scholar Commons, 2004
Secrets, Schemes, and Strategies 79
      26Nixon, Memoirs, 545.
      27Kissinger, White House Years, 699.
      28Nixon, Memoirs, 546.
      29Ibid., 549.
toward improved practical relations with Peking.”26  Although the
talks between the PRC and the United States were temporarily
halted due to the American invasion of Cambodia, diplomatic
channels reopened after a couple of months.  
Nixon opened up indirect channels to China through President
Yahya Khan of Pakistan and President Nicolae Ceausescu of
Romania in order to keep the State Department out of the negotia-
tions.27  The Department of State had a large bureaucracy and was
not very secretive, which was important to Nixon and China in the
beginning of this new relationship.  In another positive gesture
towards China, on October 26, 1970, Nixon actually called China
the “People’s Republic of China” instead of “Communist China.”28
After a series of messages between the White House and Chou En-
lai discussing the sending of an American envoy to Peking and
identifying the main obstacle to diplomatic relations as Taiwan, a
breakthrough occurred.  On April 27, 1971, a message was
received through the Pakistan channel from Chou En-lai that
stated, “The Chinese government reaffirms its willingness to
receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the
U.S. (for instance Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or
even the President of the U.S. himself for a direct meeting and
discussion.”29  The scene was now set for the United States and the
PRC to openly discuss, in person, the differences hindering
improved relations. 
 During the same month, the Chinese sent another signal
proving their desire for better relations.  Both the Chinese and the
United States table tennis team were participating in the World
Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan.  Nineteen-year-old
Glenn Cowan from Santa Monica, California, approached the
Chinese team captain to get a ride on a bus with them to see the
80 Historical Perspectives March 2004
      30Kissinger, White House Years, 709.
      31Isaacson, Kissinger, 339.
      32Kissinger, White House Years, 717.
      33Ibid., 725.
pearl farms.  In retrospect, Kissinger noted that such an event
never would have happened unless Mao and Chou En-lai explicitly
told the team to be nice to the Americans.30  Cowan later gave the
Chinese captain a T-shirt and he received a Chinese scarf in return.
However, what became known as ping-pong diplomacy was more
than just an exchange of gifts.  The Chinese actually invited the
American team to visit on April 6, and when they arrived at the
reception that Chou En-lai arranged, he proclaimed, “You have
opened a new chapter in the relations of the American and Chinese
people.”31  An invitation was extended to the Chinese team to visit
the United States as well.  Chou En-lai’s overture to the ping-pong
team was symbolic of the readiness of the Communist Chinese
government to develop relations with the United States. 
After it was certain that an American official was welcome in
Peking, the question became who to send.  After brainstorming for
possible candidates, Nixon decided on Kissinger, for he knew
Nixon’s policy best and the President could exert the most control
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Liv Ullmann.34  So, if he were to “disappear” for a couple to days
to go to China, no one would be surprised, imagining that he was
with a woman somewhere. 
Given the codename “Polo,” after the explorer Marco Polo, the
first Westerner to travel to China, Kissinger’s trip broke the ground
for President Nixon’s visit.35  To keep the trip to China secret,
Kissinger suddenly became ill with a “stomach ache” while in
Pakistan, requiring bed rest for a couple of days.36  It was during
these days, July 9-11, 1971, that Kissinger flew to China to meet
with Chou En-lai, the foreign minister with an understanding of the
Western world.  Kissinger came back from this journey with a
sense of the personality and ideology of the Chinese, especially
Chou En-lai, and had laid the groundwork for the President’s own
trip.  Kissinger and Chou En-lai worked out a joint communiqué
to be issued at the end of the trip, revealing both countries’ interest
in having the President go to China for a summit and the Presi-
dent’s acceptance of such an invitation.  In addition, the document
mentioned the purpose of the President’s trip, which was to seek
normalization of relations and to discuss “questions of concern to
the two sides.”37  This communiqué was what President Nixon read
to the American people over national television on July 15, adding
that this beginning of relations with the PRC was “not directed
against any other nation.”38  With this qualification, it appeared on
the outside that the United States was not opening up talks with the
PRC to use as leverage against the Soviet Union, although this was
exactly what the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of triangular diplomacy
was all about.  By improving relations with China, Nixon and
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Kissinger hoped the Soviet Union would be more eager to work
with the U.S.
The meetings between Kissinger and Chou En-lai, however,
amounted to more than just what was read to the public.  Kissinger
reported privately to the President that the Taiwan issue was still
the main impediment to normalization of relations, and that the
Chinese were still very fearful of the Soviet Union, which played
nicely into the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of triangular diplomacy.39
The Chinese were adamant about the United States recognizing
Taiwan as part of China and removing troops from the Taiwan
Strait, but these issues would be discussed in detail later when
Nixon met with Mao Tse-tung.  Nevertheless, Kissinger explained
to Chou En-lai that removal of troops from Taiwan was linked to
the conflict in Vietnam.40  Thus, if China wanted progress on the
removal of U.S. troops, progress had to be made in ending the war
in Vietnam.   Besides general discussions on these issues, Chou
En-lai and Kissinger worked out the basics of the President’s trip,
including what cities to visit, how long to stay, and which Ameri-
cans should attend.  
Kissinger went on a second trip to Peking in October 1971, but
this time publicly, to negotiate the joint communiqué that would be
issued after the President’s journey in February 1972.41  After
wrangling by both Chou En-lai and Kissinger about the wording of
the communiqué, a document that highlighted the common
interests of both countries while also including a section where
both countries could assert their differences, was created.  While
Kissinger was in China, the United Nations (UN) voted to expel
the Republic of China on Taiwan from the General Assembly,
while giving the PRC a seat on the Security Council.42 Although
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the United States had supported Taiwan remaining in the UN, the
fact that Kissinger’s trip to China coincided with the UN vote
caused many to speculate that Kissinger’s visit had caused the
outcome.    
President Nixon’s historic journey to China on February 21,
1972, the first ever by an American President while in office, was
largely symbolic in nature.  When President Nixon stepped off the
plane, he greeted Chou En-lai with a handshake, something
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused to do in Geneva in
1954.43  With this handshake, a new era of relations between the
two countries began.  The main workings of the joint communiqué
had already been finished months in advance between Kissinger
and Chou En-lai, and so all that was left to do was to complete the
details of the document.  This job was basically left to Kissinger
and his foreign policy aides.  Nixon spent his days in China
meeting with Chou En-lai, discussing issues of policy, sightseeing,
and attending banquets.  During the few times that Nixon was able
to meet with Mao Tse-tung, they discussed Chiang Kai-shek,
American politics, world affairs, and general policy issues between
the two countries.44  What they discussed did not really matter.
The fact that these two leaders, after years of impasse, were
speaking face to face was significant by itself.  
The Shanghai Communiqué, which was issued at the end of the
President’s trip, outlined what had been discussed and agreed upon
at the summit.45  The United States reaffirmed its desire for peace
both in Asia and the world, its support of the South Korea and
Japan, and its agreement with Nixon’s latest peace proposal for
Vietnam.  The PRC, on the other hand, declared its support for the
struggle of oppressed people and nations, its opposition to Japan,
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and its support of North Korea and the Communist peace position
in Vietnam.  On the issue of Taiwan, the United States acknowl-
edged that Taiwan was part of China, but that it was an issue the
Chinese should deal peacefully with themselves.  In time, the
United States confirmed it would remove its military presence
surrounding the country a long as “the tension in the area dimin-
ishes.”46  This last phrase shows the Nixon-Kissinger linkage
diplomacy, giving the Chinese government reason to work to end
the war in Vietnam.  China also asserted that Taiwan was part of
China, but that the People’s Republic was the only government of
China. 
Besides the talk of expanded trade, more regular diplomatic
communication, and exchanges of culture, the only true agreement
that came out of the communiqué was that both countries opposed
any country, including themselves, gaining hegemony in the
Asian-Pacific area.  This can be seen as directed toward the
Soviets, whom the Chinese thought wanted influence in the region.
This agreement also reflects the Nixon-Kissinger desire for
stability in Asia.  Essentially, the communiqué just showed that the
Chinese and the Americans agreed to disagree.  Thus, the impor-
tance of President Nixon’s trip is not what came from it, but
simply that it occurred. 
The question then becomes whether or not the President’s trip
was actually effective in achieving the Nixon-Kissinger goals.  In
other words, did improved relations with the PRC really give the
United States an advantage in talks with the Soviets, as linkage
diplomacy suggested?  In the months immediately following the
President’s announcement of his trip to Peking, Moscow did
appear to respond to the new international situation.  In a July 24,
1971 article in Pravda, less than ten days after the President’s
broadcast, the Soviets commented on the new chapter in Sino-
American relations: “It goes without saying that any designs to use
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the contacts between Peking and Washington for some ‘pressure’
on the Soviet Union…are nothing but the result of a loss of touch
with reality.”47  Although the Soviet rhetoric alluded to standing
firm, shortly thereafter, the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
indicated his desire for the President to attend a summit in
Moscow.  Progress was also made in late August 1971 on Berlin,
which had been an area of contention with the Soviet Union.  An
agreement was reached to limit the harassment of travelers from
East Berlin to West Berlin, allow West Berliners to travel using
West German passports, and permit a Soviet consulate to be
established in West Berlin.48  Even though the President had yet to
visit Peking, just the idea that he was going made the Soviets a
little more anxious and encouraged them to work with the United
States.  
The President went to Moscow in May 1972, three months
after opening up China, to work on arms agreements.  At the
Moscow summit, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of linking limits on
offensive weapons with limits on defensive agreements was
successful.  The two countries agreed to limit antiballistic missiles
(ABMs), and also signed an interim offensive agreement limiting
the number of offensive weapons to those currently in existence.49
 In the wake of President Nixon meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-
tung, the Soviets naturally became more concerned about their
relationship with the United States.  They did not want to be left
alone in this new era of Sino-American cooperation.  It was almost
as if Nixon’s trip to Peking shocked the Soviet Union into
compromising with the United States, at least in the short run. 
However, regardless of whether or not normalization was
occurring with China, the Soviet Union needed the strategic arms
limitations with the other nuclear superpower, the United States.
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An arms race between the two countries was occurring during this
time, making it in the Soviets’ best interests, both economically
and strategically, to work out an agreement with the United States,
sooner rather than later.  In this way, the United States and the
Soviet Union would remain on nuclear parity.  Strategic Arms
Limitations Talks (SALT) began to progress more rapidly after a
period of impasse even before Nixon announced that he was going
to Peking, which testifies to the fact that the Soviets were serious
in wanting improvements.50 Indirectly, Nixon’s trip could have had
an effect on Moscow’s willingness to cooperate in the later stages
of the talks, especially so soon after the historic event.  Still, a
better relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States
in and of itself was probably the main motivator for the increased
Soviet cooperation. 
As the United States slowly moved towards more normal
relations with China in the 1970s after Nixon’s initial trip, there is
no evidence that Soviet action was influenced as a result.  The
United States continued to work mainly on arms agreements with
the Soviet Union to reduce the chances of nuclear annihilation.
During the same time, China and the United States were taking
baby steps to diplomatic relations, including the establishment of
liaison offices in Washington and Peking in 1973.51  The relation-
ship between China and the United States was in no way resilient,
especially since the Chinese refused to establish diplomatic
relations or extensive trade with the United States until Nixon gave
up recognition of Chiang Kai-skek’s regime on Taiwan and the
1954 defense pact the United States had with him.52  Nixon was not
ready to commit himself to abandoning Taiwan, especially during
Watergate when he needed the support of conservative members
in Congress who had traditionally supported Chiang Kai-shek.
Therefore, from the Soviet perspective, although loose relations
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did exist between China and the United States, there were still
many issues that needed to be resolved on both sides.  The idea
that the Soviet Union would feel compelled to work with the
United States because of China is not a strong argument because
it was in the Soviet Union’s best interest to cooperate with the
United States to keep nuclear power in balance.
The Nixon-Kissinger strategy of using linkage diplomacy in
order to achieve détente with the two largest Communist nations
was a great plan on paper, but in reality, not extremely successful.
Both the Soviet Union and the PRC were better off working with
the United States regardless of whether their rival Communist
country was also.  The Sino-Soviet split could not hurt the United
States in improving relations with these countries, yet it had only
an indirect effect, if any, on Soviet motivations for cooperation.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Nixon’s opening of China was
beneficial.  With a strong anti-communist background and a
capable national security assistant in Kissinger, Nixon was able to
begin normalization of relations with the PRC that eventually led
to full diplomatic recognition in 1979.53  The Nixon-Kissinger
strategy of using China as an incentive for Soviet cooperation was
ineffective, but the results of the policy led to a new era in Sino-
American relations.
93
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 9 2004
Published by Scholar Commons, 2004
Secrets, Schemes, and Strategies 87
      53Ibid., 202.
did exist between China and the United States, there were still
many issues that needed to be resolved on both sides.  The idea
that the Soviet Union would feel compelled to work with the
United States because of China is not a strong argument because
it was in the Soviet Union’s best interest to cooperate with the
United States to keep nuclear power in balance.
The Nixon-Kissinger strategy of using linkage diplomacy in
order to achieve détente with the two largest Communist nations
was a great plan on paper, but in reality, not extremely successful.
Both the Soviet Union and the PRC were better off working with
the United States regardless of whether their rival Communist
country was also.  The Sino-Soviet split could not hurt the United
States in improving relations with these countries, yet it had only
an indirect effect, if any, on Soviet motivations for cooperation.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Nixon’s opening of China was
beneficial.  With a strong anti-communist background and a
capable national security assistant in Kissinger, Nixon was able to
begin normalization of relations with the PRC that eventually led
to full diplomatic recognition in 1979.53  The Nixon-Kissinger
strategy of using China as an incentive for Soviet cooperation was
ineffective, but the results of the policy led to a new era in Sino-
American relations.
94
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 9 [2004], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol9/iss1/1
